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When originally elaborated by the Fourth Circuit in Proud v. Stone,
the same-actor doctrine applied only when an “employee was hired
and fired by the same person within a relatively short time span.” In
the two decades since, the doctrine has widened and broadened in
scope. It now subsumes many employment contexts well beyond
hiring and firing, to scenarios in which the “same person” entails
different groups of decision makers, and the “short time span” has
been elastically extended over seven years. Per the same-actor
doctrine, when a supervisor first behaves in a way that benefits an
employee and then subsequently takes adverse action against that
employee, many federal courts conclude that the supervisor’s adverse
treatment is presumptively nondiscriminatory, adopting the strong
inference that the supervisor’s negative employment decision was not
motivated by bias.
This Article concludes that this doctrine should be curtailed.
Given the dearth of textual support and legislative history supporting
the creation of the same-actor doctrine, the striking growth rate of
this unjust doctrine in circuits that apply the strong-inference
standard, and the psychological science amassed that powerfully
reveals the errors laden within the doctrine, federal courts should
reevaluate their existing jurisprudence on the same-actor inference.
Ultimately, this Article recommends that federal courts resolve the
existing circuit split by adopting the approach of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Fundamentally, same-actor evidence
should be one evidentiary datum for the ultimate trier of fact to weigh
along with all other possible evidence of discrimination.
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Aversive racists recognize prejudice is bad, but they do not recognize
that they are prejudiced. . . . Like a virus that has mutated, racism has
also evolved into different forms that are more difficult not only to
recognize but also to combat.
––John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, On the Nature of
Contemporary Prejudice: The Causes, Consequences, and Challenges
of Aversive Racism 1
[E]stablishing one’s lack of prejudice, even with a token gesture like
choosing the best-qualified candidate who happens to be a member of
a minority group, licenses individuals to express otherwise dubious
preferences, such as those that favor Whites over minorities.
––Anna C. Merritt, Daniel A. Effron & Benoît Monin, Moral SelfLicensing: When Being Good Frees Us to Be Bad 2

1. In CONFRONTING RACISM: THE PROBLEM AND THE RESPONSE 3, 25 (Jennifer L.
Eberhardt & Susan T. Fiske eds., 1998).
2. 4 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 344, 346 (2010).
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The measure of a “rule,” the measure of a right [to be free from
unlawful bias in the workplace], becomes what can be done about the
situation. Accurate statements of a “real rule” or of a right [to be free
from discrimination in the workplace on the basis of race, color,
religion, national origin, and sex] includes all procedural limitations
on what can be done about the situation.
––Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step 3
INTRODUCTION
Over the past half century, the field of social psychology has amassed vast
scientific knowledge on how stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination
manifest and operate in the modern day. 4 Psychological science has powerfully
demonstrated that discrimination against members of many stereotyped groups
has mutated from overt “old-fashioned racism” into new forms of bias that are
more difficult to directly detect and observe, but are no less pernicious,
pervasive, and systematically unjust. 5 This psychological science has revealed
that many well-intentioned people believe themselves to be egalitarian and
unbiased, yet many of these well-intentioned people are affected by societal
stereotypes, negative racial sentiments, and implicit bias. 6 This scientific
knowledge, moreover, underscores two profound insights: First, psychological
science has shown the extent to which social contexts, situations, structures,
and institutions significantly shape how bias is expressed. 7 Second,
discrimination has evolved from primarily an intergroup phenomenon (e.g.,
discrimination turning on employers preferring white over black employees) to
both an intergroup phenomenon and a within-category problem (e.g.,

3. 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 448 (1930).
4. John F. Dovidio, On the Nature of Contemporary Prejudice: The Third Wave, 57 J. SOC.
ISSUES 829 (2001); Jason A. Nier & Samuel L. Gaertner, The Challenge of Detecting Contemporary
Forms of Discrimination, 68 J. SOC. ISSUES 207 (2012); see infra Part II.
5. See Dovidio, supra note 4; Nier & Gaertner, supra note 4.
6. John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Intergroup Bias, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 1084 (Susan T. Fiske et al. eds., 5th ed. 2010); Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice,
and Discrimination, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357, 364–67 (Daniel T. Gilbert et
al. eds., 4th ed. 1998); infra Part II.A.
7. See Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 6, at 1112; Alice H. Eagly & Amanda B. Diekman,
What Is the Problem? Prejudice as an Attitude-in-Context, in ON THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE: FIFTY
YEARS AFTER ALLPORT 19 (John F. Dovidio et al. eds., 2005); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T.
Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate
Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1039 (2006) (“One of the most important insights emerging from
social psychology in the past fifty years is the principle that situations, along with one’s subjective
construal of those situations and one’s attempt to negotiate the conflicting pressures they impose, exert
a far more powerful effect on people’s behavior than the ‘intuitive psychologist’ generally assumes.”);
infra Part II.A.
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discrimination turning on employers preferring less stereotypic or less racially
salient employees). 8
Despite this vast scientific knowledge, many federal courts today
elaborate an antidiscrimination jurisprudence that imposes on claimants
evidentiary burdens which reflect the belief that discrimination against
members of stigmatized groups necessarily manifests as old-fashioned, blatant
prejudice. 9 This worldview is in marked tension with the best scientific
evidence available on how discrimination, in fact, operates in American society
against stigmatized groups. As a consequence, the startling and widening
societal disparities in education, employment, housing, and criminal justice
between groups on account of their race, sex, and/or national origin fall farther
and farther beyond reach of existing federal antidiscrimination laws. 10
One of the most egregious examples of the epistemological and material
tension between federal employment discrimination law and psychological
science is the doctrine known as the same-actor inference of
nondiscrimination. 11 When originally elaborated by the Fourth Circuit in Proud
v. Stone, the doctrine applied only when an “employee was hired and fired by
the same person within a relatively short time span.” 12 In the two decades
since, the doctrine has widened and broadened in scope. The same-actor
inference of nondiscrimination now extends to many employment contexts
beyond hiring and firing, 13 to scenarios in which the “same person” entails

8. See DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE? RETHINKING RACE IN
“POST-RACIAL” AMERICA (2013); Irene V. Blair et al., The Influence of Afrocentric Facial Features
in Criminal Sentencing, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 674 (2004); Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking
Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes,
17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383 (2006); Cheryl R. Kaiser & Jennifer S. Pratt-Hyatt, Distributing Prejudice
Unequally: Do Whites Direct Their Prejudice Toward Strongly Identified Minorities?, 96 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 432 (2009); Cheryl R. Kaiser & Clara L. Wilkins, Group
Identification and Prejudice: Theoretical and Empirical Advances and Implications, 66 J. SOC. ISSUES
461, 462, 465 (2010); Andrew M. Penner & Aliya Saperstein, Engendering Racial Perceptions: An
Intersectional Analysis of How Social Status Shapes Race, 27 GENDER & SOC’Y 319 (2013).
9. See Nier & Gaertner, supra note 4, at 215; Victor D. Quintanilla, Critical Race
Empiricism: A New Means to Measure Civil Procedure, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 187 (2013); Kimberlé
Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego,
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Alan D.
Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of
Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1977).
10. See Quintanilla, supra note 9, at 214–15; Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L.
REV. 363 (1992).
11. Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1991); infra Part I.A; see, e.g., Brown v. CSC
Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 658 (5th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) case);
EEOC v. Our Lady of Resurrection Med. Ctr., 77 F.3d 145, 152 (7th Cir. 1996) (Title VII race
discrimination case); infra Part II.A.
12. Proud, 945 F.2d at 798; infra Part I.A.
13. See infra Part II.B.1.
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groups of decision makers who make employment decisions, 14 and the “short
time span” has been elastically extended to over seven years. 15
While the outer boundaries of the doctrine are both nebulous and in flux,
the same-actor inference may be applicable when the same actor has taken both
a positive and adverse employment action toward a claimant who brings an
employment discrimination suit. 16 Per the same-actor doctrine, when a
supervisor first behaves in a way that benefits an employee and then
subsequently takes adverse employment action against that employee, many
federal courts conclude that the supervisor’s adverse treatment of the employee
is presumptively nondiscriminatory, adopting the strong inference that the
supervisor’s negative employment decision was not motivated by bias. This
strong inference of nondiscrimination is said to be legally justifiable on
grounds of “common sense” about how humans behave and economic
rationality.
As we will discuss, these justifications are troubling and, on close
examination, fail to support the judicial creation of the same-actor doctrine. 17
Indeed, the implicit behavioral theories underpinning the same-actor doctrine
have been discredited by decades of psychological science on aversive racism,
implicit bias, and moral licensing. 18 Yet the doctrine continues to deprive
claimants of access to justice in cases in which discrimination, in fact, may
have deprived them of equal and fair employment opportunity. As originally
designed, moreover, the same-actor inference of nondiscrimination applied in a
narrow subset of employment discrimination cases. However, given the
growth, breadth, drift, and ambiguity of the doctrine’s boundaries, along with
the centralization of human resources (HR) functions in most employment
settings, the strong inference of nondiscrimination, if left unchecked, may one
day license bias in a much broader swath of employment matters. 19
Further, the doctrine grants employers a decisive defense against claims
of discrimination in a context in which psychological science reveals that
employers will behave as if they are morally licensed to discriminate. For
example, some members of the public point to having a black friend or to
having voted for President Barack Obama as moral credentials of
egalitarianism––credentials that absolve them of conduct that could be

14. See infra Part II.B.1.
15. See infra Part II.B.1.
16. See infra Part II.A.
17. See infra Part II.A.
18. See infra Part I.
19. For an excellent discussion of the dynamics of legal endogeneity in the Equal Employment
Opportunity context, see Lauren B. Edelman, Law at Work: The Endogenous Construction of Civil
Rights, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH: RIGHTS AND REALITIES 337
(Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson eds., 2005).
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perceived as racist. 20 So too, in the employment context, employers point to
having hired a female or black employee as a moral credential to absolve them
of charges that they have engaged in sex or racial discrimination. 21
Troublingly, the same-actor doctrine materially reifies and reinforces the
psychological effect of this moral credential and, in turn, increases the
likelihood that the moral licensing that follows will result in discrimination.
By providing employers with a virtually irrebuttable defense to charges of
discrimination in this context, the same-actor doctrine converts this moral
credential into a legal privilege to engage in bias, thus licensing workplace
discrimination. 22 Finally, insofar as the doctrine presumes that Title VII
prohibits only overt animus by “old-fashioned racists,” the doctrine
impermissibly denies the central purpose of Title VII, which was enacted to
eradicate discriminatory behavior within the employment sector of the U.S.
economy. 23
Two hypothetical examples of employees who challenge disparate
treatment and claim that their employers have unlawfully discriminated against
them will help explain this phenomenon. In the first, Betty is a white female 24
computer programmer who works for a technology company in Silicon Valley.
Her manager, Mike, is in charge of personnel decisions and hired her three
years ago. During Betty’s tenure at the technology company, she worked
steadfastly at the company, earning praise and consistent positive annual
reviews. As a result, Betty applied for a promotion to a supervisory position.
The technology company has very few women in supervisory positions.
However, Mike ultimately chose to promote Carl as a supervisor, even though
Carl was technically less qualified, because of Mike’s belief that Carl will
better lead a team of computer programmers.
In this scenario, many federal courts would apply the same-actor doctrine
and adopt a strong inference of nondiscrimination in favor of Mike against

20. See Daniel A. Effron et al., Endorsing Obama Licenses Favoring Whites, 45 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 590 (2009).
21. Id.
22. Benoît Monin & Dale T. Miller, Moral Credentials and the Expression of Prejudice, 81 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 33 (2001); infra Part II.C.
23. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2521 (2015).
24. While we refer to Betty as a woman, we recognize that biological sex and gender
performances are distinct constructs. For instance, while Betty is assumed to be a woman, she could
be, for example, biologically male and self-present her gender as female. See Joy L. Johnson & Robin
Repta, Sex and Gender: Beyond the Binaries, in DESIGNING AND CONDUCTING GENDER, SEX, AND
HEALTH RESEARCH 17 (John L. Oliffe & Lorraine Greaves eds., 2012); Candace West & Don H.
Zimmerman, Doing Gender, 1 GENDER & SOC’Y 125 (1987). Moreover, while we refer to Betty as a
white female programmer, we appreciate that people from many different racial and ethnic groups are
computer programmers, see #YESWECODE, http://www.yeswecode.org [perma.cc/HX6P-J4JR] (last
visited Dec. 9, 2015), and that Black female programmers experience distinct intersectional barriers in
the workplace, see BLACK GIRLS CODE, http://www.blackgirlscode.com [perma.cc/8BZ2-LSZC] (last
visited Dec. 9, 2015).
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Betty. Because Mike is the manager who hired Betty as a computer
programmer, federal courts will presumptively deem Mike’s decision not to
promote Betty to a supervisory position nondiscriminatory. Per the same-actor
doctrine, unless Betty can produce compelling evidence of sex discrimination
to dispel the strong inference of nondiscrimination—often requiring direct
evidence of discrimination—a federal court will grant summary judgment in
favor of the technology company and dismiss Betty’s case. As this example
suggests, 25 the same-actor inference is in marked tension with sociological
evidence of the glass ceiling that hinders the advancement of women in
American workplaces, 26 including in fields such as science, technology,
engineering, math, 27 and computer programming in particular. 28
25. While this example is harnessed for illustration, we developed this example by weaving
the troubling accounts reported in several U.S. Court of Appeals decisions. Cf. Philbrick v. Holder,
583 F. App’x 478 (6th Cir. 2014); Peters v. Shamrock Foods Co., 262 F. App’x 30, 31 (9th Cir. 2007);
Taylor v. Va. Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds by Desert
Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003); Richmond v. Johnson, No. 96-6329, 1997 WL 809962, at *1
(6th Cir. Dec. 18, 1997); Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795 (6th Cir. 1996); Buhrmaster v. Overnite Transp.
Co., 61 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 1995).
26. Manuela Barreto et al., Introduction: Is the Glass Ceiling Still Relevant in the 21st
Century?, in THE GLASS CEILING IN THE 21ST CENTURY: UNDERSTANDING BARRIERS TO GENDER
EQUALITY 3 (Manuela Barreto et al. eds., 2009); VIRGINIA VALIAN, WHY SO SLOW? THE
ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN (MIT Press 1998); GENDER AND OCCUPATIONAL OUTCOMES:
LONGITUDINAL ASSESSMENT OF INDIVIDUAL, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL INFLUENCES (Helen M.G.
Watt & Jacquelynne S. Eccles eds., 2008).
27. Beatriz Chu Clewell & Patricia B. Campbell, Taking Stock, Where We’ve Been, Where We
Are, Where We’re Going, 8 J. WOMEN & MINORITIES SCI. & ENGINEERING 255 (2002); Janet S. Hyde
et al., Gender Similarities Characterize Math Performance, 321 SCIENCE 494 (2008); Mary C.
Murphy et al., Signaling Threat: How Situational Cues Affect Women in Math, Science, and
Engineering Settings, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 879 (2007). See generally CHRISTINE HILL, CHRISTIANNE
CORBETT & ANDRESSE ST. ROSE, AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, WHY SO FEW? WOMEN IN SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING, AND MATHEMATICS (2010), http://www.aauw.org/learn/research
/whysofew.cfm [perma.cc/455R-F6MW]; ANNE E. PRESTON, LEAVING SCIENCE: OCCUPATIONAL
EXIT FROM SCIENTIFIC CAREERS (2004); Claude M. Steele et al., Contending with Group Image: The
Psychology of Stereotype and Social Identity Threat, in 34 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 379 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 2002); see also EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, WOMEN
AND GIRLS IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING, AND MATH (STEM) (June 2013),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/stem_factsheet_2013_07232013.pdf
[perma.cc/47FL-V48Q]; VIVAN GORNICK, WOMEN IN SCIENCE: THEN AND NOW (Feminist Press
2009); EILEEN POLLACK, THE ONLY WOMEN IN THE ROOM: WHY SCIENCE IS STILL A BOY’S CLUB
(Beacon Press 2015).
28. One of the most up-to-date and granular datasets publicly available on gender disparities in
computer programming has been compiled by Tracy Chou, a female computer programmer. See
Women-in-Software-Eng, GITHUB, https://github.com/triketora/women-in-software-eng [perma.cc/
9UVS-PWGR] (last visited Dec. 9, 2015). The spreadsheet synthesizes business-level data and
reveals gender disparities among software engineers. WOMEN IN SOFTWARE ENGINEERING STATS,
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1BxbEifUr1z6HwY2_IcExQwUpKPRZY3FZ4x4ZFzZU5E/edit?usp=sharing [perma.cc/LYS5-RHWT] (last visited Dec. 9, 2015). The spreadsheet reveals,
for example, that the percentage of female engineers at Dropbox is 10.94 percent, Airbnb is 13.52
percent, Yelp is 8.25 percent, and PayPal is 6.75 percent. The National Center for Women and
Information Technology assembles industry-level statistics on the number of women and minorities in
computer science. See NAT’L CTR. FOR WOMEN & INFO. TECH., BY THE NUMBERS (2014),
http://www.ncwit.org/sites/default/files/legacy/pdf/BytheNumbers09.pdf [perma.cc/WRB5-G9NB].
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In the second example, Jason is a black male employee of a logistics
company in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. Mike, the manager in charge of personnel
decisions, hired Jason three years ago, a period during which Jason worked
steadfastly at the company, receiving above-average annual reviews. In the
third year, Mike hired a new supervisor, Dan, who is white, and who began
overseeing Jason’s day-to-day affairs. Difficulties then began; Dan cited Jason
a number of times for a lack of productivity, which Jason felt was unjustified,
especially because Jason was working at the same pace as his coworkers.
Although Jason complains to Mike about Dan’s conduct, Mike ultimately fires
Jason after several incident reports.
Here too, because Mike is the same person who ultimately hired and fired
Jason, many federal courts will apply a strong inference of nondiscrimination,
deeming Mike’s decision to fire Jason presumptively unbiased. Unless Jason
can produce direct evidence of racial discrimination that wards off the strong
inference of nondiscrimination, federal courts will grant summary judgment
and dismiss Jason’s case; the trier of fact will never address whether prejudice
animated Mike and Dan’s behavior. 29 As the second example reveals, the
same-actor inference is in marked tension with the reality of how bias
manifests in modern American workplaces against members of stereotyped
groups.
In this Article, we introduce psychological science that speaks directly to
how bias operates in modern American workplaces so as to evaluate the sameactor inference. A paramount insight is that social contexts, situations,
structures, and institutions powerfully shape whether and how bias is expressed
against members of stereotyped groups. 30 Interpersonal and intergroup contexts
and situations shape the degree to which—in addition to when, where, and
how—bias manifests. 31 In addition to rooting out “old-fashioned racists,” a
behaviorally realistic antidiscrimination law would target the situations within
American workplaces that foment and fuel the manifestation of societal
stereotypes, negative racial sentiments, and implicit bias against members of
stereotyped groups.
One such situation—a context that directly informs the continued
application of the same-actor inference—can be derived from psychological
science on moral credentials and moral licensing. 32 In the main, people feel

29. For a case illustrating the dynamics of this example, see Ako-Doffou v. Univ. of Tex., No.
02-51287, 2003 WL 21417478 (5th Cir. June 3, 2003). For a case that suggests a more sensible way to
resolve this scenario, see Coburn v. PN II, Inc., 372 F. App’x 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2010).
30. LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Pinter & Martin Ltd. 2011) (1991); Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 6, at 1112;
Eagly & Diekman, supra note 7; Eliot R. Smith & Elizabeth C. Collins, Situated Cognition, in THE
MIND IN CONTEXT 126 (Batja Mesquita et al. eds., 2010); see infra Part II.
31. Eagly & Diekman, supra note 7.
32. See Anna C. Merritt et al., Moral Self-Licensing: When Being Good Frees Us to Be Bad, 4
SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 344 (2010); Dale T. Miller & Daniel A. Effron,
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more comfortable behaving in biased (nonegalitarian) ways when they can
point to evidence that demonstrates their previous lack of bias. 33 After making
a decision that favors a stereotyped group member, most majority group
members are less concerned with continuing to appear and behave in
egalitarian and unbiased ways. As a result, a subsequent decision about a
member of a stereotyped group is more likely to express bias when it follows
an initial unbiased decision that serves as a moral credential than when the
subsequent decision does not. This psychological science on moral credentials
and moral licensing, therefore, illuminates situations in which implicit bias may
result in workplace discrimination.
Troublingly, the U.S. Courts of Appeals that apply a strong inference of
nondiscrimination per the same-actor doctrine have the matter scientifically in
reverse. Psychological science on moral licensing reveals that, when a person
makes both an initial positive employment decision and a subsequent negative
employment decision against a member of a protected group, the second
negative decision is more likely to have resulted from bias, not less. 34 That is,
federal courts should be more vigilant to the possibility of discrimination in the
same-actor context, rather than less. Supervisors often behave as if hiring a
member of a protected group provides them with a moral credential of being
bias free, which inhibits their egalitarianism when making other decisions that
affect that employee. As such, these U.S. Courts of Appeals have developed an
interstitial doctrine that is behaviorally unrealistic and inconsistent with how
humans actually behave. The same-actor doctrine enacts a strong inference of
nondiscrimination in situations in which psychological science cautions that
discrimination is even more likely to operate unjustly.
In marked contrast, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
cautioned, criticized, and ultimately curtailed application of the same-actor
inference. 35 The Seventh Circuit has adopted the most appropriate
jurisprudential approach, one that leaves weighing same-actor evidence—along
with all other circumstantial evidence—for the trier of fact to reach a lawful
decision on the merits. In brief, the same-actor situation should not be deemed
circumstantial evidence in favor or against discrimination; rather, same-actor

Psychological License: When It Is Needed and How It Functions, in 43 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 115 (Mark P. Zanna & James M. Olson eds., 2010).
33. Jill C. Bradley-Geist et al., Moral Credentialing by Association: The Importance of Choice
and Relationship Closeness, 36 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1564 (2010); Effron et al.,
supra note 20; Daniel A Effron et al., Inventing Racist Roads Not Taken: The Licensing Effect of
Immoral Counterfactual Behaviors, 103 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 916 (2012); Daniel A.
Effron, Making Mountains of Morality from Molehills of Virtue: Threat Causes People to
Overestimate Their Moral Credentials, 40 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 972 (2014); Nikki
H. Mann & Kerry Kawakami, The Long, Steep Path to Equality: Progressing on Egalitarian Goals,
141 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 187 (2012); Monin & Miller, supra note 22.
34. Effron et al., Inventing Racist Roads, supra note 33; Monin & Miller, supra note 22.
35. See Perez v. Thorntons, Inc., 731 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2013); Williams v. Vitro. Servs.
Corp., 144 F.3d 1438 (11th Cir. 1998).
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evidence should be left for the trier of fact to weigh with all other evidence of
prejudice. Our primary recommendation is that the Seventh Circuit should be
justly lauded and rightly followed. This recommendation flows directly from
an empirical study of the growth rate in the application of the same-actor
doctrine at summary judgment we report in this Article. We find that the
growth rate in the application of the doctrine at summary judgment has risen
and that the growth rate among circuits differs markedly. 36 Problematically,
these growth models predict that, unless the doctrine is curtailed, the growth
rate of this unjust doctrine will rise greater still. 37
The Article will proceed as follows: Part I introduces psychological
science on prejudice, aversive racism, and moral licensing, first discussing
three waves of psychological science on prejudice, then psychological science
on aversive racism and the importance of a situational understanding of bias,
and finally to moral licensing literature. Part II turns to the same-actor
inference, first discussing the origins, justifications, and scope of the doctrine
and turning next to its evolution and permutations. Part III then reports our
empirical analyses on the same-actor inference, revealing the doctrine’s
troubling and differential growth across circuits. Part IV offers our conclusions
and recommendations. In Part IV, we also highlight epistemological tension
between the flawed assumptions of the same-actor inference and the best
scientific evidence available. We then turn to a more nuanced understanding of
how moral licensing operates in modern workplaces, discuss the lack of a
legitimate and neutral rationale for the same-actor doctrine, and end with our
recommendations for curbing the doctrine’s growth. Finally, we conclude with
additional insights that synthesize our jurisprudential recommendations.
I.
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE ON PREJUDICE, AVERSIVE RACISM, AND MORAL
LICENSING
We first turn to psychological science on prejudice, aversive racism, and
moral licensing, elaborating a body of knowledge in the psychological and
behavioral sciences that has accumulated over the past half century. First, we
describe three historical waves of psychological science to underscore how
prejudice has evolved from a primarily blatant and overt phenomenon to
encompass less blatant and more complex forms. Second, we introduce
research on aversive racism, thereby illuminating the importance of a
situational approach to understanding when bias manifests. Last, we turn to a
particular situation, mainly moral licensing, a context in which actions are
perceived as providing moral credentials that, in turn, license and lead to
discrimination.

36.
37.

See Figs.1 & 2 in Section III.B.
See text following Fig.2 in Section III.B.
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A. Three Historical Waves of Psychological Science on Prejudice and
Discrimination
Over the past century, scientific study of prejudice has progressed in three
waves. 38 From the 1920s through the 1950s, psychologists in the first wave
conceived of prejudice as a form of psychopathology. They considered racism
to be a dangerous and abnormal deviation from normal tendencies, rather than
a disruption in normal thinking. 39 By way of one of our introductory examples,
in the first wave, researchers would have been primarily concerned with
whether Jason’s manager, Mike, and his supervisor, Dan, were racist—whether
Mike and Dan espoused “old-fashioned” blatant racism against black
employees. If so, Mike and Dan would have been deemed bad apples who
acted out of a psychopathology.
In the 1950s through the 1980s, psychologists in the second wave
reconceptualized prejudice as widespread and rooted in normal rather than
abnormal thought processes. 40 Gordon Allport’s profound insights epitomized
the views of this second wave. 41 Focus shifted from prejudice as a
psychopathology to how normal cognitive and socialization processes influence
the manifestation of prejudice. 42 Prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination
were reconceived as the result of cognitive processes—social cognition and
social categorization—associated with classifying social information. 43 For
example, in the second wave, researchers may have investigated whether Dan
exhibited a greater propensity to construe Jason’s behavior as inadequate
compared to white employees; that is, stereotypes and schemas about black
employees may have shaped Dan’s attributions about Jason’s performance.

38. See Dovidio, supra note 4, at 830–33. In presenting this brief history of the field’s study of
racial prejudice, I draw a distinction between the history of studying the causes and consequences of
racial prejudice and the history of psychologizing racial differences. For an excellent account of the
latter history, see generally DEFINING DIFFERENCE: RACE AND RACISM IN THE HISTORY OF
PSYCHOLOGY (Andrew S. Winston ed., 2004).
39. See Dovidio, supra note 4, at 830; John Harding & Russell Hogrefe, Attitudes of White
Department Store Employees Toward Negro Coworkers, 8 J. SOC. ISSUES 18, 18–28 (1952). For a
discussion on prejudice and ethnic relations, see G.M. Gilbert, Stereotype Persistence and Change
Among College Students, 46 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 245 (1951); Daniel Katz & Kenneth
Braly, Racial Stereotypes of One Hundred College Students, 28 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 280
(1933).
40. See Dovidio, supra note 4, at 831; Eagly & Diekman, supra note 7, at 17–27; Thomas F.
Pettigrew, Personality and Sociocultural Factors in Intergroup Attitudes: A Cross-National
Comparison, 2 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 29, 29 (1958).
41. See Gordon W. Allport, Prejudice and the Individual, in THE AMERICAN NEGRO
REFERENCE BOOK 706, 707, 710 (John P. Davis ed., 1966) (“Research suggests that perhaps 80
percent of the American people harbor ethnic prejudice of some type and in some appreciable
degree. . . . With the aid of aversive categories [many] avoid the painful task of dealing with
individuals as individuals. Prejudice is thus an economical mode of thought, and is widely embraced
for this very reason.”).
42. See Dovidio, supra note 4, at 831; Pettigrew, supra note 40, at 29.
43. See Dovidio, supra note 4, at 831; Fiske, supra note 6, at 357 (“On the cusp of the twentyfirst century, stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination have not abated.”).
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Moreover, while Mike chose not to investigate Jason’s complaints, Mike may
have more closely investigated complaints brought by in-group members
against a supervisor belonging to an out-group.
In the 1990s, psychologists in the third wave harnessed sophisticated new
technologies to study implicit processes that were once theorized but not
directly measured. 44 These new technologies measure implicit associations—
that is, implicit bias and automatic and unconscious attitudes and beliefs. 45
While explicit measures of prejudice rely on self-reports, implicit measures
draw on a variety of psychological measures, including response latency
measures of association (such as the Implicit Association Test), physiological
responses, nonverbal behavior, word-fragment completion, linguistic cues, and
fMRI imaging. 46 These new methods enabled social psychologists to assess
individual differences in implicit and explicit attitudes and helped to identify
those who explicitly adopt egalitarian values, but who nonetheless are
influenced by stereotypes and implicit bias. 47 These psychological scientists
also investigated when, how, and why intergroup contexts and situations
influence the manifestation of bias 48—a fundamental insight, social contexts
and situations powerfully influence the expression of prejudice and implicit
bias. 49 In the third wave, researchers would have shifted attention to new
methods to reveal discrepancies between Mike’s and Dan’s explicit selfpresentations of egalitarianism and their implicit attitudes against black
employees and in favor of white employees. While the second wave theorized a
distinction between explicit and implicit attitudes, researchers in the third wave
may have directly measured this disassociation using sophisticated methods.
Using these methods, researchers may have studied whether Mike and Dan
self-identify as egalitarian but nonetheless hold implicit biases against black
employees, and if so, whether and how various social contexts, structures, and
institutions within the workplace allow this bias to manifest.
B. Aversive Racism and a Situational Understanding of Bias
Aversive racism rests on a contradiction between explicit and implicit
attitudes. 50 This form of modern prejudice characterizes the racial attitudes of

44.
45.
46.

See Dovidio, supra note 4, at 832.
See Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 6, at 1084; Fiske, supra note 6.
See John F. Dovidio et al., Implicit and Explicit Prejudice and Interracial Interaction, 82
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 62 (2002); Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 6, at 1086; Dovidio,
supra note 4, at 838; Wendy Berry Mendes et al., Challenge and Threat During Social Interactions
with White and Black Men, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 939 (2002).
47. See Dovidio, supra note 4, at 835.
48. See Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 6, at 1112.
49. See id.; Eagly & Diekman, supra note 7.
50. See SAMUEL L. GAERTNER & JOHN F. DOVIDIO, REDUCING INTERGROUP BIAS: THE
COMMON INGROUP IDENTITY MODEL 13–14 (2000); B. Keith Payne & C. Daryl Cameron, Divided
Minds, Divided Morals: How Implicit Social Cognition Underpins and Undermines Our Sense of
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many well-intentioned people who possess strong egalitarian values and
believe themselves to be nonprejudiced but who nonetheless hold negative
racial feelings and stereotypes. 51 For aversive racists, implicit bias coexists
with egalitarian beliefs and the denial of personal prejudice. John Dovidio and
his colleagues refer to this modern form of prejudice as “aversive” for two
reasons: First, rather than manifesting open antagonism, many majority-group
members feel anxiety toward minority-group members, which leads them to
avoid interracial interactions. 52 Second, because aversive racists adhere to
egalitarian principles, they find the thought that they are prejudiced disquieting
and disturbing. 53
Over the past decades, social psychologists have revealed that situations
shape and influence the expression of implicit bias. 54 Aversive racists aspire to
be nonprejudiced. They do not discriminate against minority-group members in
situations with strong egalitarian norms, where discrimination would be
obvious to others and themselves. 55 In these conditions, aversive racists avoid
feelings, beliefs, and behaviors that would be associated with bias. Yet aversive
racists express bias subtly and in ways that can be rationalized under conditions
of situational ambiguity—when norms are unclear, when situations are
ambiguous, when the correct choice is uncertain—then bias against minoritygroup members can be rationalized on some factor other than race. 56 In these
situations, aversive racists may discriminate against minority-group members
in ways that allow them to maintain a nonprejudiced self-concept. 57
A robust body of social-psychological research has investigated these
phenomena. Many studies examine employment situations in which majoritygroup members exhibit in-group preferences in favor of majority-group

Social Justice, in HANDBOOK OF IMPLICIT SOCIAL COGNITION: MEASUREMENT, THEORY, AND
APPLICATIONS 445 (Bertram Gawronski & B. Keith Payne eds., 2010).
51. See John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism and Selection Decisions:
1989 and 1999, 11 PSYCHOL. SCI. 315, 315–16 (2000); Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 6; Payne &
Cameron, supra note 50.
52. See John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, When Good People Do Bad Things: The
Nature of Contemporary Racism, in COVERT RACISM 111, 113 (Rodney D. Coates ed., 2011);
Jennifer A. Richeson & J. Nicole Shelton, When Prejudice Does Not Pay: Effects of Interracial
Contact on Executive Function, 14 PSYCHOL. SCI. 287, 287 (2003).
53. See Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 52, at 111–20.
54. See, e.g., Laura G. Babbitt & Samuel R. Sommers, Framing Matters: Contextual
Influences on Interracial Interaction Outcomes, 37 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1233
(2011); Krieger & Fiske, supra note 7, at 1039–40; Richeson & Shelton, supra note 52.
55. See Christopher L. Aberson & Tara E. Ettlin, The Aversive Racism Paradigm and
Responses Favoring African Americans: Meta-Analytic Evidence of Two Types of Favoritism, 17 SOC.
JUST. RES. 25, 42–43 (2004).
56. See, e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, Aversive Racism, supra note 51, at 316–18.
57. See James D. Johnson et al., Justice Is Still Not Colorblind: Differential Racial Effects of
Exposure to Inadmissible Evidence, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 893 (1995).
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members while withholding assistance to minority-group members. 58 In these
studies, decisions are affected by stereotypes, social cognition, and implicit
bias, resulting in disparate treatment toward minority-group members. 59
Nevertheless, this bias is rationalized after the fact: subjective decision-making
criteria change, standards subtly shift, and the weight accorded to this decisionmaking criterion varies depending on whether the decision is about an in-group
versus an out-group member. 60
This important research reveals the fallacy of equating all prejudice
against members of stereotyped groups as a “taste” or “preference” for
discrimination. 61 Unfortunately, some scholars have analogized the
psychological discomfort experienced toward members of different groups as a
taste for race or sex discrimination. 62 Yet, decades of psychological science
have revealed that, while many members of the American public experience
aversion toward different groups (e.g., anxiety and uneasiness leading to
awkwardness or avoidance), because members of the public simultaneously
endorse egalitarian beliefs, the very thought that one could be prejudiced is
aversive. 63 Moreover, in contrast to blatant dislike of an out-group, aversive
racism may entail a strong favoring of one’s in-group, which nevertheless
results in disparate treatment and outcomes. 64 For example, within the
workplace, majority group members may be more willing to share valuable
information about employment opportunities with other majority group
members, rather than stereotyped group members. As such, characterizing all
prejudice as a taste for racism or sexism is at best error, and at worst, a botched
metaphor that distracts attention to bias as depicted in the first wave of
psychological research—psychopathology—rather than more modern,
complex, and pervasive forms of the psychological phenomenon.
C. Psychological Science on Moral Credentials and Moral Licensing
Psychological science on moral credentials and moral licensing
demonstrates that people are more likely to act in ethically questionable ways
when they can point to evidence that they have a virtuous character. 65 For

58. See John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism, in 36 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1, 16 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 2004); see also Michael I. Norton et
al., Casuistry and Social Category Bias, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 817, 820–22 (2004).
59. See Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 58; see also Gordon Hodson et al., Processes in
Racial Discrimination: Differential Weighting of Conflicting Information, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 460 (2002); Norton et al., supra note 58; Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen,
Constructed Criteria: Redefining Merit to Justify Discrimination, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 474 (2005).
60. See Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 58; see also Norton et al., supra note 58.
61. See generally GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971).
62. See generally id.
63. See Samuel L. Gaertner et al., Aversive Racism: Bias Without Intention, in HANDBOOK OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH, supra note 19, at 377.
64. Id.
65. See Merritt et al., supra note 32; Miller & Effron, supra note 32.
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example, people are more likely to engage in discriminatory behavior in an
ambiguous situation when they have previously demonstrated a lack of
prejudice. 66 According to research on moral licensing, the initial opportunity to
express unprejudiced attitudes provides a moral credential that reduces the
salience of egalitarian norms on subsequent decision making and behavior.
Because a person has engaged in a prior nonprejudiced act, the ambiguously
discriminatory nature of a subsequent act is reappraised as legitimate rather
than prejudicial. That is, an initial egalitarian decision acts as a moral credential
that changes the way people construe their own ambiguously discriminatory
behavior. After making an initial nonprejudiced decision, the salience of norms
that demand egalitarianism tend to reduce and people are less likely to conceive
of their own behavior as potentially biased.
In these moral licensing studies, people are first granted the opportunity to
express their egalitarian views or to exhibit their lack of prejudice by making
an unbiased decision in favor of a member of a stereotyped group. 67 This first
step psychologically provides people a moral credential. In a seminal study, for
example, participants were asked to consider five job applicants for a starting
position in a consulting firm. 68 The study manipulated whether the stellar
candidate among the five applicants was a white woman, black man, or white
man. When participants were presented with and then selected either the stellar
white woman or black man, they were more likely to discriminate against
female and minority employees in favor of a white man in subsequent
employment decisions. These studies have revealed other ways in which to
prompt moral credentials. Simply declaring one’s egalitarian values has been
found to trigger this psychological effect, as has freely writing about a positive
experience with a member of a stereotyped group and imagining a racist action
that one could have taken but avoided in the past. 69 By engaging in these kinds
of egalitarian acts, people later tend to behave as if they have a moral
credential, increasing the likelihood that they will engage in bias.
After exhibiting a lack of prejudice in the first phase in these
psychological experiments, people then encounter an ambiguous decision in
which it is possible—potentially legitimate and rationalizable—to discriminate
against members of stereotyped groups. These psychological studies reveal that
participants are more likely to express bias in the subsequent decision. Moral
licensing occurs when the second decision presents people with an ambiguous
situation that contains a seemingly legitimate reason to discriminate against a
member of a stereotyped group, such as gender-specific job norms, 70 racial
66. See Bradley-Geist et al., supra note 33; Effron et al., supra note 20; Effron et al., Inventing
Racist Roads, supra note 33; Effron, Making Mountains of Morality, supra note 33; Mann &
Kawakami, supra note 33; Monin & Miller, supra note 22.
67. See Monin & Miller, supra note 22.
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
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hostility in a small town hiring police officers, 71 and scarce resources for
dealing with crime. 72 Because the first equalitarian decision suggests to oneself
and others that one is neither sexist nor racist, one ceases to reflect on
remaining egalitarian in subsequent decisions, thereby making it more likely
that these later decisions will be tainted by bias.
Synthesizing these two steps and returning to the seminal experiment on
moral licensing, 73 white participants were asked to view five job candidates
and were told to pick the best candidate for the job. Half of the participants
were assigned to a condition in which there were four white candidates and one
black candidate. The black candidate was made to look the most exceptional of
all candidates (e.g., prestigious education, highest GPA), subsequently causing
participants to select the star black candidate. For the other half of the
participants, there was no black candidate, just five white candidates, one of
whom was also portrayed as the star candidate; thus participants in this
condition all selected a white candidate for the job. According to the theory of
moral credentialing, participants who were in the condition where they had the
opportunity to select a black candidate would feel less psychological
dissonance in behaving negatively toward subsequent black employees. In the
second phase of the study, all participants were then given the opportunity to
learn about an opening for a police officer position in a department that had a
reputation for being hostile toward African Americans. They were then asked
to indicate whether the police officer position was better suited for a black or
white candidate. Ultimately, participants in the condition in which they had
previously had the opportunity to hire a black candidate were more likely than
those who had not had this opportunity to state that an open police officer
position was better suited for a white candidate than a black candidate. Thus,
ironically, engaging in an initial positive behavior toward a member of a
stereotyped group freed white participants to make a subsequently biased
decision in a situation where behaving biasedly could be rationalized as
potentially unbiased.
The psychological processes underlying moral credentialing have been
observed outside the laboratory setting as well, although these tests have
occurred in more general moral domains. For example, in a study of over
twelve hundred adults in the United States and Canada, participants were
messaged (on smartphones) several times a day for three days and asked about
moral behaviors they observed and committed during the past hour. 74 Evidence
of moral credentialing was observed such that participants who engaged in a
moral act at one point in the day were significantly more likely to engage in an

71. See Bradley-Geist et al., supra note 33; Effron et al., supra note 20; Effron et al., Inventing
Racist Roads, supra note 33; Monin & Miller, supra note 22.
72. See Effron et al., supra note 20; Effron et al., Inventing Racist Roads, supra note 33.
73. See Effron et al., supra note 20.
74. Wilhelm Hofmann et al., Morality in Everyday Life, 345 SCIENCE 1340 (2014).
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immoral act later that day. This naturalistic study highlights how individuals
use their prior behavior as a basis to understand their moral self-concept,
permitting them to behave less morally in contexts in which immoral acts can
be justified without impugning their moral character.
II.
THE SAME-ACTOR INFERENCE OF NONDISCRIMINATION
We will begin by elaborating the origins of the same-actor inference
doctrine and the doctrine’s troubled justifications. We then turn from the
Fourth Circuit’s original elaboration of the doctrine in Proud v. Stone to the
same-actor doctrine’s evolution and ever widening boundaries. We close by
discussing the divide among the U.S. Courts of Appeals on the legal effect of
the same-actor doctrine.
A. The Same-Actor Inference
In the early 1990s federal courts began applying the same-actor inference
doctrine as a means of swiftly resolving motions for summary judgment in
federal employment discrimination cases. 75 The doctrine applies in
employment discrimination cases that proceed under the theory of disparate
treatment. Under Title VII, the ultimate issue in a disparate treatment case is
whether the claimant was discriminated against because of the claimant’s race,
color, religion, national origin, or sex. 76 Given the difficulty of producing
direct evidence of discrimination, most claimants proceed at summary
judgment under the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine burden-shifting framework
and advance circumstantial evidence of disparate treatment. Depending on the
quality and quantum of circumstantial evidence that a plaintiff presents, a
federal court may rule that the plaintiff has offered sufficient evidence that the
defendant’s nondiscriminatory reason for adversely treating her was pretextual.
In such a case, a federal court would deny summary judgment, thereby
allowing the case to be presented to the jury for final resolution on the merits.
At summary judgment, however, many U.S. Courts of Appeals require
federal district courts to apply the same-actor doctrine in employment
discrimination cases. 77 Indeed, the same-actor doctrine has been applied at

75. See Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds
by Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); Buhrmaster v. Overnite Transp.
Co., 61 F.3d 461, 464 (6th Cir. 1995); LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 847 (1st Cir. 1993);
Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1991).
76. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012). Title VII also prohibits retaliation against employees who
oppose discrimination or participate in Title VII processes. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a) (2012); 1 BARBARA
T. LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 10–90 (4th ed. 2007).
77. See Arraleh v. Cty. of Ramsey, 461 F.3d 967, 976 (8th Cir. 2006) (Title VII race and
national origin discrimination case); Antonio v. Sygma Network, Inc., 458 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2006)
(Title VII race and national origin discrimination case); Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d
267 (9th Cir. 1996); Brown, 82 F.3d at 658 (ADEA case); EEOC v. Our Lady of Resurrection Med.
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summary judgment in cases that assert disparate treatment discrimination on
account of race, 78 sex, 79 national origin, 80 disability, 81 and age. 82 These courts
apply the same-actor doctrine when a supervisor first makes a decision that
benefits the claimant and later that same supervisor makes another decision that
adversely affects the claimant. The implicit theory supporting the doctrine is
that a supervisor who holds bias against members of a stereotyped group would
never have hired a member of such group (e.g., African Americans or women)
in the first place; as such, because the supervisor has hired a member of the
stereotyped group, the supervisor holds no bias against them, and hence the
subsequent adverse decision cannot be discrimination.
While frequently applied at summary judgment, the same-actor doctrine
has considerable procedural breadth and has been incorporated into virtually all
other federal civil procedural contexts: the pleading stage, 83 summary
judgment, 84 judgment as a matter of law, 85 and trial. 86 Troublingly, courts after
Twombly have also extended the same-actor inference to the pleading stage. 87
For example, in Long v. Teradata Corp., a district court applied the same-actor
inference at the pleading stage and dismissed an amended complaint after
declaring several of the plaintiff’s allegations to be legal conclusions and then
deeming the remaining allegation insufficient to overcome the strong inference

Ctr., 77 F.3d 145, 152 (7th Cir. 1996) (Title VII race discrimination case); Buhrmaster, 61 F.3d at 464
(Title VII sex discrimination case); Tyndall v. Nat’l Educ. Ctrs., Inc., 31 F.3d 209, 215 (4th Cir. 1994)
(ADA case); LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 847 (ADEA case); Lowe v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 963 F.2d 173,
174–75 (8th Cir. 1992) (ADEA case).
78. See Hobdy v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 386 F. App’x 722, 724 (9th Cir. 2010).
79. See Bradley, 104 F.3d at 271.
80. See Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co., 413 F.3d 1090, 1097 (9th Cir. 2005).
81. See Jacques v. Clean-Up Grp., Inc., 96 F.3d 506, 512 (1st Cir. 1996); Tyndall, 31 F.3d at
215.
82. See Brown, 82 F.3d at 658.
83. See Springs v. Mayer Brown, LLP, No. 3:09cv352, 2009 WL 3461231, at *6 (W.D.N.C.
Oct. 20, 2009), objections overruled, No. 3:09cv352, 2010 WL 2347946 (W.D.N.C. June 9, 2010).
84. See Spears v. Patterson UTI Drilling Co., 337 F. App’x 416 (5th Cir. 2009); Peters v.
Shamrock Foods Co., 262 F. App’x 30, 31 (9th Cir. 2007); Antonio v. Sygma Network, Inc., 458 F.3d
1177 (10th Cir. 2006); Coghlan, 413 F.3d 1090; Boyd v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 158 F.3d 326 (5th Cir.
1998); Faruki v. Parsons S.I.P., Inc., 123 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 1997); Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795 (6th
Cir. 1996); Lowe v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 963 F.2d 173, 174 (8th Cir. 1992).
85. See Terrance v. Pointe Coupee Par. Police Jury, 177 F. App’x 457 (5th Cir. 2006); Burton
v. Town of Littleton, 426 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2005); Hernandez v. Muns, No. 96-40087, 1996 WL 661171
(5th Cir. Oct. 21, 1996).
86. See Buhrmaster v. Overnite Transp. Co., 61 F.3d 461, 464 (6th Cir. 1995). Several cases
involved appeals in instances in which the court declined to provide a jury instruction regarding the
same-actor inference. In these cases, the U.S. Courts of Appeals most often affirmed the district
court’s decision not to provide such an instruction. See Jackson v. Host Int’l, Inc., 426 F. App’x 215
(5th Cir. 2011); Banks v. Travelers Cos., 180 F.3d 358 (2d Cir. 1999); Parra v. Premier Salons Int’l,
Inc., No. 97-50782, 1998 WL 792738 (5th Cir. Nov. 5, 1998); Kim v. Dial Serv. Int’l, Inc., No. 979142, 1998 WL 514297 (2d Cir. June 11, 1998).
87. See Springs, 2009 WL 3461231, at *6.
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resulting from the same-actor doctrine. 88 Moreover, federal courts have applied
the same-actor doctrine at trial, instructing juries on the same-actor inference
and advising them, when applicable, to draw the strong inference of
nondiscrimination when reaching a verdict. 89
Let us return to our first hypothetical discussed in the Introduction, where
Mike denied Betty’s application for a promotion to a supervisory position and
chose to promote Carl as a supervisor even though Carl was less qualified. 90
Here, unless Betty can produce extremely compelling direct evidence of
discrimination that overcomes the strong inference of Mike’s
nondiscrimination, Betty’s claim of sex discrimination will not survive
summary judgment. The same-actor inference presumes that Mike’s decision to
promote Carl over Betty cannot be influenced by gender bias because Mike
hired Betty three years before. As this example suggests, this doctrine operates
as a material restraint on breaking the glass ceiling by licensing discrimination
at the promotion stage against women who have been hired by the same
manager, despite psychological science which warns that, by first hiring these
women, these managers are less likely to inhibit bias when failing to promote
them.
In the second example, per the same-actor doctrine, federal courts will
deem Mike’s decision to fire Jason, a black man, presumptively free of
discrimination and the case will be dismissed at summary judgment, unless
Jason can produce compelling direct evidence of Mike’s intentional racial
discrimination that overcomes the strong inference of nondiscrimination. But
here, as well, psychological science on moral licensing explains that, because
Mike hired Jason to begin with, Mike will likely behave as if he holds a moral

88. See Long v. Teradata Corp., No. 1:12cv787, 2012 WL 6026441, at *4 (E.D. Va. Dec. 4,
2012) (applying the same-actor inference when dismissing a § 1981 claim at the pleading stage);
Springs, 2009 WL 3461231, at *6 (applying the same-actor inference to dismiss complaint at pleading
stage). There are several examples of district courts, however, explicitly rejecting application of the
same-actor inference at the pleading stage. See FirstMerit Bank v. Ferrari, 71 F. Supp. 3d 751, 756
(N.D. Ill. 2014); King v. U.S. Sec. Assocs., Inc., No. 11 Civ. 4457, 2012 WL 4122025, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 4327396 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
18, 2012); O’Diah v. Yogo Oasis, No. 11-cv-309, 2012 WL 691534, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2012).
There are also several examples in which employers sought dismissal based, in part, on the same-actor
inference, in which district courts declined to apply the doctrine because the antecedents necessary for
application of the doctrine had not been established. See Hagan v. City of New York, 39 F. Supp. 3d
481, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (rejecting the same-actor inference where the plaintiff alleged that she was
hired to quiet minority employees complaining of discrimination and that employer made potentially
discriminatory remarks); Penn v. N.Y. Methodist Hosp., No. 11-cv-9137, 2013 WL 5477600, at *14
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2013) (rejecting same-actor inference given the time-span between hiring and
firing); Barrentine v. River Place Nursing Ctr., L.L.C., No. 1:11CV072, 2013 WL 494074, at *5 (N.D.
Miss. Feb. 7, 2013) (rejecting same-actor inference at the pleading stage where multiple people were
involved in the hiring and firing decision); Blakely v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 1042,
1047 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (refusing to apply the same-actor inference and suggesting exceptions to the
general rule).
89. See Buhrmaster, 61 F.3d at 461.
90. See supra Introduction, at 7–7.
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credential, increasing the hazard that he will make a biased decision at the
firing stage later. Here, the same-actor doctrine reifies this psychological
license into a legal license to engage in bias, thereby making it even more
likely that injustice will operate against stereotyped employees in American
workplaces.
1. Origins of the Same-Actor Doctrine
The earliest reference to the same-actor inference is Proud v. Stone, a
1991 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 91 When
crafting the same-actor doctrine, the Fourth Circuit referenced a law review
article, authored by Professors John Donohue and Peter Siegelman, 92 for the
proposition that “[c]laims that employer animus exists in termination but not in
hiring seem irrational.” 93
In their article, Professors Donohue and Siegelman sought to explain the
rise in employment discrimination filings between 1969 and 1987 and to
account for the compositional shift in the kinds of employment-discrimination
claims: mainly, the shift from hiring to discharge claims. 94 Donohue and
Siegelman discussed a number of explanations for the rising filing rate, such as
macroeconomic trends and changes in the legal backdrop, including adoption
of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) and the Age Discrimination
Enforcement Act (ADEA). They sought to dispel several explanations for the
rise in discrimination claims, including an increase in societal discrimination,
the promotion of employment-discrimination litigation by plaintiff lawyers,
and changes in the propensity for Americans to sue. 95 The authors ultimately
concluded that none of these explanations fully accounted for the rise in filings.
Instead, Professors Donohue and Siegelman offered an alternate
explanation “consistent with increasing litigation in an era of declining
discrimination.” 96 They cited national surveys on racial attitudes suggesting
that overt prejudice had steadily waned. 97 Ultimately, Donohue and Siegelman
theorized that the increase in filing of employment discrimination cases could

91. See Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1991).
92. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983 (1991).
93. See id. at 1017.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 1001 (“Growth in discrimination”), 1003 (“Litigation promoted by lawyers”)
(“Changes in propensity to sue”).
96. See id. at 1001.
97. They note that survey studies document changes in self-reported beliefs and external
conduct but do not answer the fundamental question of whether or not people harbor prejudice against
minority groups. Id. Indeed, there is considerable social psychology literature that demonstrates that
people self-censor when self reporting their own beliefs about stereotypes and the degree to which
they would engage in discrimination in a particular context. Further, people often lack awareness into
their own implicit processes and claim to be egalitarian, even when their actions suggest otherwise.
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be explained by minorities receiving better jobs and workplace integration. 98
Specifically, they posited that, as women and minorities enter the workforce,
the resulting increased wages and the prevalence of comparators make it much
more likely for women and minorities to detect, appraise, and prove differences
in treatment. 99 The authors did not conclude that women and minorities faced
greater levels of societal discrimination per se or resistance when rapidly
entering American workplaces. Instead, their primary explanation was that
minority-group members who enter the workplaces would have a greater
economic incentive and ability to detect and prove discrimination.
In explaining the shift from hiring claims to firing claims, Donohue and
Siegelman theorized that one would observe this compositional shift because
women and minorities no longer needed to complain about blanket exclusions
from good jobs. Whereas in 1966, hiring charges outnumbered termination
charges by 50 percent, by 1985 the pattern had reversed. The authors posited
that societal discrimination and the nature of prejudice in American workplaces
could not account for the rising rate of discharge claims. 100
While the authors explored a number of explanations for the rise in
discharge claims, they did not examine the hypothesis that this rise could be
attributed to the changing nature of prejudice against women and minorities in
American workplaces––the shift from overt animus to modern forms of bias,
such as aversive racism. Instead, the authors equated unlawful discrimination
with overt animus, i.e., a taste for discrimination. When conceptualized in this
manner, a sexist or racist who harbors overt animus against women or
minorities would have refused to hire women and minorities in the first place.
If this were the case, one would have hypothesized that hiring claims would be
higher than firing claims all else being equal, rather than the reverse. As such,
blatant racism and sexism could not explain the rise in discharge claims.

98. See id. at 984–85, 1006–11 (“The ‘better jobs’ effect”), 1011–14 (“The ‘integration’
effect”).
99. See id. at 1006–15 (“[T]he better-jobs and integration effects have an ironic aspect: The
attainment of better and more integrated jobs for minorities is clearly a major goal of
antidiscrimination laws, but society’s very success in meeting this goal has contributed to a sizable
increase in employment discrimination lawsuits. Improvements in the workplace have spawned strife
in the courtroom.”).
100. Id. at 1017 (“Claims that employer animus exists in termination but not in hiring seem
irrational: it hardly makes sense to hire workers from a group one dislikes (thereby incurring the
psychological costs of associating with them), only to fire them once they are on the job. Such
behavior seems doubly irrational given that the expected penalties for terminating a worker are
probably much higher than for failing to hire her.” (footnotes omitted)). For the model of animusbased employer discrimination, see BECKER, supra note 61, at 13–38; see also Donohue & Siegelman,
supra note 92, at 1017 n.106. Donohue and Siegelman also noted that the legal standards for proving
discrimination in hiring as opposed to firing cases did not change during this period, nor were there
changes in the calculation of damages. On the latter point, they note that the probability of being sued
for termination is six times greater than that for hiring given the availability of evidence. See Donohue
& Siegelman, supra note 92, at 1017 n.107.
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Soon after Donohue and Siegelman’s article was published, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit quoted the above-mentioned language
in its seminal decision articulating the same-actor inference doctrine. Proud v.
Stone involved Warren Proud’s age discrimination claim against the U.S.
Army. In Proud, the person who fired Proud was the same person who had
hired him six months earlier. Affirming the lower court’s decision to grant
summary judgment on Proud’s age-discrimination case, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that Proud’s case raised no genuine issue of material fact:
One is quickly drawn to the realization that “[c]laims that employer
animus exists in termination but not in hiring seem irrational.” From
the standpoint of the putative discriminator, “[i]t hardly makes sense to
hire workers from a group one dislikes (thereby incurring the
psychological costs of associating with them), only to fire them once
they are on the job.” Therefore, in cases where the hirer and firer are
the same individual and the termination of employment occurs within
a relatively short time span following the hiring, a strong inference
exists that discrimination was not a determining factor for the adverse
action taken by the employer. 101
Unfortunately, the court in Proud v. Stone predicated the same-actor doctrine
upon an erroneous psychological account. As previously discussed, blatant
animus against women and minorities in hiring diminished between 1969 and
1989, given that express rules barring the inclusion of women and minorities
from the workplace were dismantled and affirmative-action policies began to
offer equal access to American workplaces. 102 Though American workplaces
began to dismantle blanket exclusions and to implement affirmative action
programs, the manifestation of implicit bias in favor of in-group members and
against out-group members increased at later stages of the employment
relationship, including promotion and termination. As workplaces became
more diverse and diversity structures were poorly managed, majority-group
members were more likely to express implicit bias in favor of in-group
members and against women and minorities. That is, changing demographics in
the workplace made social identity salient for many majority-group members
who experienced the growing workplace representation of out-group members
with anxiety and discomfort, as a threat for scarce resources and finite
employment opportunities. 103

101. See Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 797 (4th Cir. 1991) (alterations in original) (citation
omitted).
102. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
103. See HENRI TAJFEL, HUMAN GROUPS AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES: STUDIES IN SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY (1981); Marilynn B. Brewer, In-Group Bias in the Minimal Intergroup Situation: A
Cognitive-Motivational Analysis, 86 PSYCHOL. BULL. 307 (1979); Henri Tajfel & John Turner, An
Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS
33, 45–46 (William G. Austin & Stephen Worchel eds., 1979); Henri Tajfel et al., Social
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Moreover, while explicit intergroup (between-group) bias against women
and minorities began to wane, intragroup (within-category) bias began to wax
against minorities and women for being too stereotypical, for failing to abide
by prescriptive self-presentation norms, for failing the double-bind against
minorities for being “too black, not acting white enough,” and for being “too
feminine, not assertive enough” or “too masculine, bitchy.” 104 So too, bias
began to mutate like a disease into more challenging and persistent forms,
including aversive racism, benevolent sexism, 105 and intersectional bias. 106
As a result, the changing pattern of discrimination cases had much to do
with the complex interaction and combined effect of many factors: prohibitions
on express discriminatory bars on hiring, the mandate of affirmative-action
policies in some workplaces to counteract the history of blatant racism and
sexism against stereotyped group members, the changing nature of societal
discrimination in American workplaces from blatant to less overt, and the
phenomenon of implicit bias increasingly operating in favor of in-group
members and against out-group members in American workplaces and via
within-category bias. Troublingly, claims that employer bias existed at
termination and promotion—especially during the period between 1969 and
1989 107—were not only plausible but likely 108 given the influx of women and
minorities into workplaces and the pervasive level of societal discrimination
against members of stigmatized groups during this period. 109 In short, the
Fourth Circuit premised the doctrine on an erroneous psychological account of

Categorization and Intergroup Behaviour, 1 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 149 (1971); Henri Tajfel, Social
Psychology of Intergroup Relations, 33 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 1 (1982).
104. See Kaiser & Pratt-Hyatt, supra note 8; Joan C. Williams, Double Jeopardy? An
Empirical Study with Implications for the Debates over Implicit Bias and Intersectionality, 37 HARV.
J.L. & GENDER 185, 189–205 (2014).
105. See Peter Glick & Susan T. Fiske, An Ambivalent Alliance: Hostile and Benevolent Sexism
as Complementary Justifications of Gender Inequality, 56 AM. PSYCHOL. 109 (2001); Peter Glick &
Susan T. Fiske, The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory: Differentiating Hostile and Benevolent Sexism, 70
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 491 (1996).
106. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Policies, 1989 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 139; see Lawrence, supra note 9 at 322 (“Much of one’s inability to know racial
discrimination when one sees it results from a failure to recognize that racism is . . . a disease. This
failure is compounded by a reluctance to admit that the illness of racism inflects almost everyone.”).
107. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 92, at 986.
108. Indeed, one national survey of over two thousand adults conducted in 1972 found that 9
percent of respondents said that they had experienced job discrimination at least once in the last year.
See Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Scaling the Pyramid: A Sociolegal Model of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH, supra note
19, at 3, 18 (citing BARBARA A. CURRAN, AM. BAR FOUND., THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC: THE
FINAL REPORT OF A NATIONAL SURVEY 103 (1977)). A second national survey reported that about 11
percent of those surveyed had experienced illegal or unfair treatment. Id. (citing KRISTIN BUMILLER,
THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMS 424 (1988)).
109. See JAMES W. VANDER ZANDEN, AMERICAN MINORITY RELATIONS: THE SOCIOLOGY OF
RACE AND ETHNIC GROUPS (2d ed. 1966); Dovidio & Gaertner, Aversive Racism, supra note 51, at
316 (exploring both racial attitudes and discrimination from 1988–89 to 1998–99).
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prejudice, one that obscures how stereotyped groups experience bias in
American workplaces.
So began the same-actor inference doctrine.
2. Two (Troubled) Justifications for the Same-Actor Inference: Common
Sense and Economic Rationality
Federal courts have articulated two reasons for the same-actor inference,
justifying the doctrine on grounds of “common sense” and economic
rationality. Applying the “common sense” theory, federal courts have
explained that when the same actor is involved in both hiring and firing a
claimant, a strong inference of nondiscrimination is warranted because a
decision maker who dislikes members of a protected group would incur
“psychological costs” by associating with them and firing them later. As such,
this explanation presumes that a person who hires a claimant is extremely
unlikely to hold bias toward that claimant or the claimant’s protected group. 110
This “common sense” rationale for the doctrine is implicitly predicated on the
lay psychological account111 that people who hold bias against members of
stereotyped groups experience dissonance when closely working with them. As
such, these supervisors anticipate and avoid the dissonance by choosing not to
hire out-group members.
This lay psychological account is, of course, troubling, as we will explore
in Part IV. 112 Most Americans endorse egalitarian beliefs while also exhibiting
implicit bias against members of stereotyped groups. 113 Many Americans
110. See Antonio v. Sygma Network, Inc., 458 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2006); O’Brien v. Lucas
Assocs. Pers., Inc., 127 F. App’x 702 (5th Cir. 2005); Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 658
(5th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S.
133 (2000); Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267 (9th Cir. 1996); Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d
796, 797 (4th Cir. 1991); see also Wofford v. Middletown Tube Works, Inc., 67 F. App’x 312, 318
(6th Cir. 2003). But see Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1999) (criticizing the
descriptive accuracy of this implicit theory).
111. As Krieger and Fiske have elsewhere described, we might refer to such a lay theory as a
psychological metatheory underpinning legal theories as opposed to the legal theory itself. See Krieger
& Fiske, supra note 7, at 998 n.2.
112. We leave for another day the more general critique of premising legal jurisprudence on
“common sense,” “collective opinion,” and folk theories rather than on empirically based knowledge
and scientific evidence. See generally BEYOND COMMON SENSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM (Eugene Borgida & Susan T. Fiske eds., 2008). Since the dawn of Western civilization,
philosophers have cautioned against premising law, morality, and justice on unexamined, common
opinion. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, ETHICS (Jonathan Barnes & Anthony Kenny trans., Princeton Univ.
Press 2014) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS]; ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS (Richard
Hope trans., Columbia Univ. Press 1952); ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC (George A. Kennedy trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2006); DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING (Peter Millican ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (1748); JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY
CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (Roger Woolhouse ed., Penguin Books 1997) (1689)
[hereinafter LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING]; PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (R.E. Allen trans., Yale Univ.
Press 2008) [hereinafter PLATO, THE REPUBLIC].
113. Dovidio & Gaertner, Aversive Racism, supra note 51, at 315; Hodson et al., supra note 59,
at 460–64.
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would find it aversive to overtly deliberate on whether to hire a member of a
stereotyped group in light of the potential discomfort of associating with
them. 114 Such explicit reasoning threatens virtually every American’s sense of
rationality, egalitarianism, and nonprejudice. Nonetheless, societal
discrimination is pervasive and persistent. 115 This is, in part, because in
contemporary American society prejudice limits the opportunities of minorities
in ways more difficult to detect and eradicate, such as through structures that
allow implicit bias to operate against members of stereotyped groups and
institutions that result in disparate outcomes. 116 When hiring discrimination
occurs, this discrimination may have been influenced by implicit bias. The
expression of this bias can be considered from the perspective of dual-process
theories in psychology. Dual-process perspectives on prejudice demonstrate
that bias is likely to occur when situations afford discretion and subjectivity, as
these contexts provide many potential reasons for any given decision and
individuals may believe they are objective when they are in fact influenced by
implicit biases and stereotypes.
Second, some courts predicate the same-actor inference doctrine on
“economic rationality.” Federal courts that elaborate this basis contend that
employer animus at termination, rather than at hiring, is economically
irrational. The implicit behavioral theory behind this justification presupposes
that, rather than hiring workers from a group one dislikes and firing them later,
an economically rational discriminator would refuse to hire stereotyped group
members at all: put rather bluntly, given the transaction costs of hiring and
training employees, refusing to hire a worker from the stigmatized group would
be more economically rational. Further, given the difficulty of proving
discrimination in hiring as compared to firing, an efficient discriminator would
choose to discriminate at hiring rather than firing. As such, discrimination
within American workplaces is unlikely.
As Part IV will elaborate, the economic irrationality justification is deeply
flawed. The economic irrationality account presumes, for example, that bias
114. See Dovidio & Gaertner, Aversive Racism, supra note 51; Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note
6; Hodson et al., supra note 59, at 460.
115. Monica Biernat & Diane Kobrynowicz, Gender- and Race-Based Standards of
Competence: Lower Minimum Standards but Higher Ability Standards for Devalued Groups, 72 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 544 (1997); Dovidio & Gaertner, Aversive Racism, supra note 51, at
318; Hodson et al., supra note 59, at 460–64.
116. See Marc Bendick, Jr. & Ana P. Nunes, Developing the Research Basis for Controlling
Bias in Hiring, 68 J. SOC. ISSUES 238, 239–43 (2012); Dovidio & Gaertner, Aversive Racism, supra
note 51, at 315, 318; Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 6; Dovidio, supra note 4, at 836–38; Dovidio &
Gaertner, supra note 52, at 111–20; Krieger & Fiske, supra note 7, at 1032–34; Nier & Gaertner,
supra note 4, at 209–10; Devah Pager & Bruce Western, Identifying Discrimination at Work: The Use
of Field Experiments, 68 J. SOC. ISSUES 221, 230 (“Based on the evidence we can glean from the
interactions between testers and employers in our field experiments, it seemed that only in rare cases
were employers categorically unwilling to hire African Americans.” (citing Devah Pager et al.,
Discrimination in a Low-Wage Labor Market: A Field Experiment, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 777, 787–88
(2009))); Richeson & Shelton, supra note 52, at 287.
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against members of stereotyped groups operates like ordinary preferences that
consumers seek to cost-benefit maximize in market transactions. Yet decades
of social psychological research have revealed that contemporary prejudice
does not operate like ordinary consumer preferences. 117 Most Americans would
not openly deliberate at the hiring stage on how to hedonically maximize a
misogynistic or hostile racial preference in cost-benefit fashion. 118 To be sure,
biased decisions can, and often are, rationalized after the fact based on
seemingly neutral criteria—a phenomenon known as casuistry or shifting
standards. 119 Even so, one must distinguish the phenomenon of rationalizing a
biased decision post hoc 120 from the phenomenon of arriving at a biased
decision after cost-benefit maximizing a psychopathological taste for
discrimination. That is, people’s actual behavior does not follow the dictates of
the efficient discriminator model, 121 and the economic rationality account is an
inaccurate depiction of how people, in fact, behave in the day-to-day. Despite
the “economic irrationality” of bias in American workplaces, discrimination
persists.
B. Evolution and Permutations of the Same-Actor Inference
In this Section, we describe the evolution and permutations of the sameactor doctrine—that is, the ever-widening boundary of factual scenarios in
which courts have applied the same-actor inference. We turn first to the
antecedent factual postures triggering application of the doctrine and then to
the legal consequences of the doctrine at summary judgment.

117. See Dovidio, supra note 4, at 830–33; Krieger & Fiske, supra note 7, at 1028, 1037, 1051;
Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations and Affirmative Action, 86
CALIF. L. REV. 1251, 1310 (1988); see also Dan Ariely & Michael I. Norton, How Actions Create—
Not Just Reveal—Preferences, 12 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 13 (2008).
118. Unfortunately, instances occur in which businesses seek to cater to the discriminatory
preferences of their customers or employees. See United States v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., No. 04-CV4237, 2010 WL 3855191 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2010).
119. See Norton et al., supra note 58.
120. See Monica Biernat & Kathleen Fuegen, Shifting Standards and the Evaluation of
Competence: Complexity in Gender-Based Judgment and Decision Making, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES. 707
(2001); Julie E. Phelan et al., Competent Yet Out in the Cold: Shifting Criteria for Hiring Reflect
Backlash Toward Agentic Women, 32 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 406 (2008).
121. See AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 177 (2009) (“The relation between rational
choice and actual behaviour connects, in fact, with a long-standing divide in the discipline of
economics, with some authors tending to think that it is by and large correct to assume that people’s
actual behaviour would follow the dictates of rationality, while others remain deeply sceptical of that
presumption. This difference in foundational assumptions about human behaviour, and in particular
the scepticism about taking actual behaviour to be identifiably rational, has not, however, prevented
modern economics from using rational choice quite extensively as a predictive device. The assumption
is used often enough without any particular defence, but when some defence is given, it tends to take
the form of either arguing that as a general rule this is close enough to the truth (despite some wellknown divergence), or that the assumed behaviour is useful enough for the purpose at hand, which
may differ from seeking the most truthful description.”).
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1. Antecedent Fact Patterns Triggering the Same-Actor Inference
When first designed by the Fourth Circuit in Proud v. Stone, the court
defined the same-actor inference doctrine as follows: “In cases where the hirer
and the firer are the same individual and the termination of employment occurs
within a relatively short time span following the hiring, a strong inference
exists that discrimination was not a determining factor for the adverse action
taken by the employer.” 122 Since first elaborated, the doctrine has loosened
from this original factual mooring and drifted, widening in meaning and scope.
Federal courts have significantly extended the allowable timespan between
favorable and unfavorable action; broadened the doctrine to employment
practices beyond hiring and firing, such as promotion and transfers; and
expanded the meaning of “same individual” to include different groups of
people who make employment decisions. Additionally, some federal courts
enhance the flawed doctrine when the actor and claimant are of the same
protected group. 123
Regarding the timespan between favorable and unfavorable treatment,
Proud v. Stone envisioned that the strong inference of nondiscrimination would
apply only when these employment actions were “within a relatively short time
span.” 124 Nonetheless, circuit courts are now divided on whether the nexus of
time connecting the positive and adverse employer actions is a necessary
criterion of the same-actor doctrine at all. For example, in Buhrmaster v.
Overnite Transportation Co., the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision to instruct the jury on the same-actor inference, despite the fact that
the case involved a period of seven and a half years. En route, the Sixth Circuit
concluded that “a short period of time is not an essential element of the same
actor inference, at least in cases where the plaintiff’s [protected] class does not
change.” 125
In a number of cases, moreover, the Fifth Circuit affirmed application of
the same-actor inference when the favorable and unfavorable actions were
three years apart, 126 four years apart, 127 and five years apart. 128 Finally, in two

122. See Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 797 (4th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added).
123. See Robinson v. Am. Acryl NA, LLC, No. H-06-570, 2007 WL 471121 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 8,
2007); Stover v. Hattiesburg Pub. Sch. Dist., No. 2:05CV388KS, 2007 WL 465664 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 8,
2007), aff’d in part, 549 F.3d 985 (5th Cir. 2008); Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651 (5th Cir.
1996), abrogated on other grounds by Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133
(2000).
124. See Proud, 945 F.2d at 797.
125. Buhrmaster v. Overnite Transp. Co., 61 F.3d 461, 464 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Coghlan v.
Am. Seafoods Co., 413 F.3d 1090, 1097 (9th Cir. 2005) (“First, this length of time [of three years]
would be significant only had Coghlan proffered evidence suggesting that Andreassen developed a
bias against [his protected group] during that period; but he did not.”).
126. See Faruki v. Parsons S.I.P., Inc., 123 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 1997).
127. See O’Brien v. Lucas Assocs. Pers., Inc., 127 F. App’x 702 (5th Cir. 2005).
128. See Brooks v. Lubbock Cty. Hosp. Dist., 373 F. App’x 434 (5th Cir. 2010); Boyd v. State
Farm Ins. Cos., 158 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 1998).
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troubling examples, the Fifth Circuit applied the same-actor inference despite
the fact that the favorable and unfavorable employment actions were more than
seven years apart. 129
Applying these approaches to our example involving Betty the computer
programmer, a federal district court would be within the allowable bounds of
doctrinal leeway to impose a strong inference of nondiscrimination where
Mike’s decision to hire Betty and his failure to promote her were more than
three years apart. Problematically, this example is precisely the factual scenario
in which most failure-to-promote claims arise: after learning, growing, and
gathering experience for several years, employees often seek promotions.
When the person who originally takes favorable action toward a claimant
is not the same person who adversely treats the claimant, the same-actor
inference does not apply. 130 Even so, federal courts have broadened the “same
individual” requirement to apply to collective or group decision making. Thus
the same-actor inference now applies when groups of people engage in
employment decision making. 131 Often this doctrinal permutation has applied
when virtually the same group of people makes both the favorable and
unfavorable decisions. However, several circuit courts have affirmed the grant
of summary judgment when many (as opposed to most or all) of the decision
makers were the same. 132
129. See Lewis v. 20th-82nd Judicial Dist., No. 99-50189, 1999 WL 642898 (5th Cir. July 29,
1999).
130. See Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, 199 F.3d 572 (1st Cir. 1999) (declining to apply
the same-actor inference in a Title VII action at the summary judgment stage when the person who
originally hired the claimants differed from the person who subsequently failed to reinstate them),
abrogated on other grounds by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003); see also Burgess v.
Bowen, 466 F. App’x 272 (4th Cir. 2012); Russell v. Mountain Park Health Ctr. Props., 403 F. App’x
195, 195–96 (9th Cir. 2010); cf. Wolgat v. Tam-O-Shanter Country Club, No. 97-1135, 1998 WL
69281 (6th Cir. Feb. 10, 1998) (affirming the grant of summary judgment against plaintiff alleging sex
discrimination under Title VII in discriminatory termination for alternate reasons).
131. See Mischer v. Erie Metro Hous. Auth., 168 F. App’x 709 (6th Cir. 2006); DeJarnette v.
Corning Inc., 133 F.3d 293, 295–96 (4th Cir. 1998) (same company); Amirmokri v. Balt. Gas & Elec.
Co., 60 F.3d 1126, 1128–29 (4th Cir. 1995) (same company); Lowe v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 963
F.2d 173, 174 (8th Cir. 1992) (same company officials or same people); Campbell v. All. Nat’l Inc.,
107 F. Supp. 2d 234, 237–39 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); cf. Wofford v. Middletown Tube Works, Inc., 67 F.
App’x 312 (6th Cir. 2003); Jones v. Yonkers Pub. Sch., 326 F. Supp. 2d 536, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(“[T]he [same-actor] inference may be applied even when the supervisor at issue . . . is not the only
person with input into the hiring and firing decision. The inference ‘is applicable so long as one
management-level employee played a substantial role in both the hiring and firing of the plaintiff.’”
(quoting Ramos v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d 328, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2001))).
132. See Houk v. Peoploungers Inc., 214 F. App’x 379 (5th Cir. 2007) (one of multiple decision
makers); Antonio v. Sygma Network, Inc., 458 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2006) (same) (affirming summary
judgment granted against employee who brought claim against former employer asserting Title VII
claims for race and national origin discrimination, retaliation, and other claims, and applying sameactor inference in the context of the discrimination claims at the pretext stage); Keri v. Bd. of Trs. of
Purdue Univ., 458 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2006) (same), overruled by Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965
(7th Cir. 2013); Wofford v. Middletown Tube Works, Inc., 67 F. App’x 312 (6th Cir. 2003) (same);
Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (same); Sreeram v. La. State Univ.
Med. Ctr.-Shreveport, 188 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 1999) (same).
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This doctrinal permutation is in tension with realities in the modern
American workplace. 133 In our second hypothetical, if Mike hired Jason, and
Mike and Dan (his seemingly prejudiced supervisor) were both involved in
deciding to fire him several years later, a court might nonetheless apply the
same-actor inference doctrine. Mike was the “same individual” who played a
role in both hiring and firing Jason; hence, a court would presume that the
decision to fire was not discriminatory. Even assuming that a single individual
is unbiased within a larger group, the presence of that individual in the second
group should not be legally presumed to block the expression of bias against a
member of a protected group. Indeed, the mere presence of a group can
decrease the likelihood that a well-intentioned person will speak up or engage
in actions that run counter to situational norms, especially when the person
setting the norm has power and status. The doctrine, moreover, presumes that
the group of people who made the first favorable action was unbiased; yet, as
we discuss below, several compelling reasons exist as to why the first group
may have chosen to hire a member of a protected group. For example, the
female or black candidate might have been unambiguously the most qualified
candidate, and the hiring team might have deployed clear, determinate hiring
criteria.
This permutation is also predicated on the implicit theory that people who
comprise a decision-making group are more likely to confront bias. Yet fear of
reprisal or censure prevents many well-intentioned, egalitarian actors from
speaking up in groups and curtailing bias. 134 Considerable psychological
science exists on the extent to which individuals confront wrongdoers within
groups to reduce sexism and racism within workplaces. 135 While research
reveals that majority-group members and minority-group members are
generally inclined to confront bias when imagining a sexist or racist encounter,
in reality many women and minorities remain silent in actual sexist or racist
encounters. For example, confrontation requires that decision makers detect
discrimination, perceive the incidence as urgently requiring rectification,
personally take responsibility to confront, and decide how to confront. 136 At the
same time, there are material and psychological barriers to confronting

133. See Jean-Baptiste v. K–Z, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 2d 652 (N.D. Ind. 2006). Professor Natasha
Martin ably argues this point and problematizes the modern workplace’s dynamics of collective
decision making and organizational dimensions. Natasha T. Martin, Immunity for Hire: How the
Same-Actor Doctrine Sustains Discrimination in the Contemporary Workplace, 40 CONN. L. REV.
1117 (2008).
134. See Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?:
Discrimination in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495, 496–500 (2001)
(applying insights from the social psychology of group decision making to disparate treatment cases
involving multiple decision makers).
135. See Julia C. Becker et al., Confronting and Reducing Sexism: A Call for Research on
Intervention, 70 J. SOC. ISSUES 603, 605–08 (2014).
136. See Sarah J. Gervais & Amy L. Hillard, Confronting Sexism as Persuasion: Effects of a
Confrontation’s Recipient, Source, Message, and Context, 70 J. SOC. ISSUES 653, 654–56 (2014).
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prejudice, including social costs to the person who confronts, such as fear of
retaliation or being perceived as overreacting, whiny, oversensitive,
interpersonally cold, troublemaking, self-interested, or egoistic. 137 Moreover,
people are far less likely to confront bias when the perpetrator holds more
power in an employment setting than the would-be confronter. 138
The breadth of the favorable employment action that triggers the sameactor inference has broadened from hiring to other actions, some formal, others
quite informal. For example, the antecedent employment action has extended
from hiring to recommending hiring, 139 from promotion 140 to recommending
promotion, 141 to transfer, 142 rehiring, 143 and even abstaining from taking
potentially unfavorable action against the claimant, such as by providing
employee performance scores that are high enough to avoid vulnerability to
discharge. 144 The latter courts appear to suggest that withholding unfavorable
action against a female or minority employee on a prior occasion may trigger a
strong inference of nondiscrimination on a later date. 145
Returning to our second hypothetical, assume that another manager,
Steven, hires Jason, and then Mike transfers Jason to a logistics warehouse that
the logistics company thinks is more favorable than Jason’s original location.
At the new warehouse, Dan is assigned as Jason’s supervisor; problems begin.
If Mike later terminates Jason after Dan’s unjustified write-ups, Mike would be
deemed the same-actor, and many courts would apply the same-actor doctrine
and presume that Mike’s firing of Jason was nondiscriminatory.
Taken together, these doctrinal permutations are precisely those that
plaintiff-side employment-discrimination attorneys have urged their colleagues
to raise when distinguishing their cases from those in which the same-actor

137. See, e.g., id. at 655–56 (“[A] woman who confronts may be seen as acting with selfinterest and conforming to expectations, whereas a man who confronts may be seen as acting without
self-interest and violating expectations, which may cause surprise and positive regard.”).
138. See Leslie Ashburn-Nardo et al., Do You Say Something When It’s Your Boss? The Role of
Perpetrator Power in Prejudice Confrontation, 70 J. SOC. ISSUES 615, 617–22 (2014).
139. See Bergeron v. Sw. La. Hosp. Ass’n, No. 98-31019, 1999 WL 766403, at *13 (5th Cir.
Aug. 31, 1999) (affirming district court grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on claims
of sexual harassment); Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 957 (4th Cir. 1996).
140. See Taylor v. Va. Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 231 (4th Cir. 1999), abrogated on other
grounds by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003); Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795, 804 (6th
Cir. 1996).
141. See Philbrick v. Holder, 583 F. App’x 478 (6th Cir. 2014) (affirming in part and reversing
in part the grant of summary judgment).
142. See Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co., 413 F.3d 1090, 1097 (9th Cir. 2005); Washington v.
Valspar Indus. Coatings Grp., No. 01-60458, 2002 WL 753503 (5th Cir. Apr. 9, 2002) (affirming the
grant of summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim of discriminatory firing based on age); LeBlanc v.
Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 847 (1st Cir. 1993).
143. See Sreeram v. La. State Univ. Med. Ctr.-Shreveport, 188 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 1999).
144. See Idemudia v. J.P. Morgan Chase, 434 F. App’x 495 (6th Cir. 2011); EEOC v. Boeing
Co., 577 F.3d 1044, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2009) (allowing the court to apply the same-actor inference but
not requiring a “strong inference”).
145. See Idemudia, 434 F. App’x at 495; Boeing Co., 577 F.3d at 1051–52.
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doctrine first began. 146 These plaintiff-side employment-discrimination
attorneys have urged their colleagues, when apt, to contend that new and
different persons are involved in hiring and firing, that the passage of time
should defeat the doctrine’s application, and that the same-actor inference
should not apply in failure-to-promote cases. 147 Yet these are precisely the
doctrinal permutations that many federal courts have broadened the boundary
of the doctrine to subsume. While some scholars have critiqued the advocacy
of plaintiff-side employment attorneys for failing to raise similar objections, 148
the substantive doctrine is adrift, widening and leaving less leeway for counsel
to press arguments to the contrary.
2. Presumption Enhanced When the Claimant and Actor Belong to the
Same Protected Group
Further, many federal courts expressly strengthen the same-actor
inference when the “actor” (i.e., the supervisor, manager, or employer) is of the
same racial, gender, or ethnic group as the claimant. 149 This doctrinal
permutation has been applied in the context of claimants and supervisors who
belong to the same protected groups based on age, 150 gender, 151 and race. 152
Indeed, in one unusual case reversed by the Seventh Circuit, a magistrate judge
heightened the same-actor inference where both the supervisor and claimant
belonged to protected groups, albeit different protected groups: the supervisor
was Hispanic and the plaintiff was black. 153 There, the lower court appears to
have presumed either that interracial bias between minority groups does not
exist or that minorities cannot harbor bias, two lay theories that decades of

146. See Lisa Dunne, Challenge “Same Actor” Inference on Summary Judgment, JAMES PUB.
(Jan. 16, 2014), http://jamespublishing.com/2014/employment-discrimination [http://perma.cc/72KZLRM7].
147. Id.
148. See Scott A. Moss, Bad Briefs, Bad Law, Bad Markets: Documenting the Poor Quality of
Plaintiffs’ Briefs, Its Impact on the Law, and the Market Failure It Reflects, 63 EMORY L.J. 59 (2013).
149. See Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds
by Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (applying same-actor doctrine
when defendant shared claimants’ class as a strengthened inference); Stover v. Hattiesburg Pub. Sch.
Dist., No. 2:05CV388KS-MTP, 2007 WL 465664, at *9 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 8, 2007), aff’d in part, 549
F.3d 985 (5th Cir. 2008); Robinson v. Am. Acryl N.A., No. H-06-570, 2007 WL 471121, at *3 (S.D.
Tex. Feb. 8, 2007); Mercer v. Capitol Mgmt. & Realty, Inc., 242 F. App’x 162, 164 (5th Cir. 2007);
see also Hervey v. Miss. Dep’t of Educ., 404 F. App’x 865, 871 (5th Cir. 2010).
150. See, e.g., Washington v. Valspar Indus. Coatings Grp., No. 01-60458, 2002 WL 753503
(5th Cir. Apr. 9, 2002) (affirming the grant of summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim that he was
discriminatorily fired because of his age); LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 847 (1st Cir.
1993).
151. See O’Brien v. Lucas Assocs. Pers., Inc., 127 F. App’x 702 (5th Cir. 2005).
152. See Hobdy v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 386 F. App’x 722, 724 (9th Cir. 2010).
153. See Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1999) (affirming and reversing
summary judgment ruling on racial discrimination claim).
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social psychological literature have discredited. 154 This decision is a highly
aggressive doctrinal elaboration that impermissibly extends the doctrine, as
some courts have warned. 155
This permutation implicitly presumes that all members of a stereotyped
group, such as black employees or female employees, will not engage in bias or
discrimination against other members of their own stereotyped groups. This
doctrinal permutation, however, fails to connect with the phenomenon of
intragroup bias (e.g., bias by black employees against other black employees
who experience the “racial doublebind” of being perceived as “not black
enough” or “too black,” too Afrocentric, or stereotypically black). 156 Further
the doctrinal elaboration fails to reach intersectional discrimination (e.g., a
white female manager may not harbor bias against other white women or black
men, but may harbor bias against black women). 157 Consider, for example, a
variation of the hypothetical in which Mike, a black male supervisor, failed to
promote Betty, a black female programmer, in favor of Carol, a white female
programmer, with less experience.
Some federal courts have signaled that heightening the same-actor
inference in this situation is inappropriate and in tension with the U.S. Supreme
Court’s rejection of a “conclusive presumption” that an employer, or
presumably its agents, will not discriminate against members of its own race or
gender. 158 In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., for example, the
Court explicitly advised that, “[b]ecause of the many facets of human
motivation, it would be unwise to presume as a matter of law that human
beings of one definable group will not discriminate against other members of
their group.” 159 Despite Oncale, however, many courts still heighten the
inference of nondiscrimination in this scenario.
3. Legal Effect of the Same-Actor Inference
In this Section, we now turn from the evolving antecedents of the sameactor doctrine to the legal consequence of the same-actor inference at summary
judgment. To situate this discussion, we first briefly explain how federal courts
adjudicate most disparate treatment claims at summary judgment.
Given the difficulty of unearthing “smoking-gun” or direct evidence of
intentional discrimination during discovery, most plaintiffs produce

154. See Jenessa R. Shapiro & Steven L. Neuberg, When Do the Stigmatized Stigmatize? The
Ironic Effects of Being Accountable to (Perceived) Majority Group Prejudice-Expression Norms, 95 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 877 (2008).
155. See Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 155 (2d Cir. 2004).
156. See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 8, at 15; Shapiro & Neuberg, supra note 154, at 877.
157. See Crenshaw, supra note 106, at 140; Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who
Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991).
158. See Feingold, 366 F.3d at 155.
159. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (quoting Castaneda v.
Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977)).
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circumstantial evidence of disparate-treatment discrimination at summary
judgment. 160 That is, most plaintiffs provide circumstantial evidence from
which a court may infer that an employer discriminated. This circumstantial
evidence is evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine burden-shifting
scheme, which allocates the burden of production and order for presenting
proof. 161
Under the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework, plaintiffs must first
establish a prima facie case of discrimination. This prima facie case has been
described as a “sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of
common experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination” at
summary judgment. 162 To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must prove
that (1) she is a member in a protected class, (2) she was qualified for a given
job, (3) she was subject to an adverse employment action, and (4) a causal
connection exists between the adverse action and the protected characteristic.
In practice, on the fourth element, many federal courts now require plaintiffs to
prove that employers treated similarly situated employees outside the protected
class more favorably. 163 For example, Betty in our first hypothetical would
establish a prima facie case of disparate-treatment discrimination based on the
failure to promote her by showing that she was qualified for the denied
promotion and that the man ultimately promoted, Carl, was not similarly
qualified.
If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the
employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment
action. 164 This burden is merely one of production, not of persuasion, meaning
160. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (discussing direct versus
circumstantial evidence under Title VII); LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 76.
161. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–56 (1981); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see also Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49
n.3 (2003) (interpreting the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (same); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 505–12
(1993) (same).
162. See U.S. Postal Serv Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983) (quoting
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,
534 U.S. 506, 510–11 (2002), overruled in part on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007).
163. See, e.g., Winsley v. Cook Cty., 563 F.3d 598, 605 (7th Cir. 2009). In disparate-treatment
cases, the last element—whether the employer treated similarly situated people outside of the
plaintiff’s protected class differently—is often determinative of whether a claim withstands summary
judgment. See LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 76, at 23. Circuit courts disagree on how
rigorously to apply this final element. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120
YALE L.J. 728, 743–48 (2011) (explaining that the “similarly situated” element has in essence become
a widely employed heuristic). Some require plaintiffs to show that “similarly situated” employees were
nearly identical in all or most respects. See, e.g., Perez v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 395 F.3d 206,
213 (5th Cir. 2004); Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 1999). Others hold plaintiffs
to a less exacting standard. See, e.g., Rodgers v. U.S. Bank, 417 F.3d 845, 852 (8th Cir. 2005),
abrogated by Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011); Ortiz v. Norton, 254 F.3d
889, 894–95 (10th Cir. 2001).
164. See Raytheon Co., 540 U.S. at 49 n.3.
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that federal courts do not review the “credibility” or plausibility of the
employer’s rationale. 165 If the employer offers some nondiscriminatory reason
for the adverse action, the presumption of intentional discrimination
disappears. In the third and final step, the plaintiff must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s reason was mere pretext for
discrimination. 166 In deciding whether the defendant’s explanation is
pretextual, the court may consider the evidence establishing plaintiff’s prima
facie case and any inferences properly drawn therefrom. 167 Courts have applied
this summary judgment framework to a wide variety of workplace
circumstances, including hiring, discharge, discipline, promotion, transfer,
demotion, retaliation, and other adverse employment actions. 168
At the pretext stage, Betty could establish that the technology company’s
purported nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to promote her was pretextual,
masking sex bias. Mike explained that, though Carl was technically less
qualified, he thought Carl would be a better leader of computer programmer
teams. Betty could attempt to show that Mike’s decision was based on gender
stereotypes that women are not as competent and capable as men in science and
engineering fields, including computer science. 169
Connecting McDonnell Douglas-Burdine to the legal effect of the sameactor inference, federal courts have operationalized the same-actor inference at
the third step of the summary judgment framework. 170 In this third step,

165. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142 (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ct., 509 U.S. at 509).
166. See Raytheon Co., 540 U.S. at 49 n.3; Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143.
167. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143.
168. See LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 76, at 12–13.
169. See Hill et al., supra note 27, at 38 (“Negative stereotypes about girls’ and women’s
abilities in mathematics and science persist despite girls’ and women’s considerable gains in
participation and performance in these areas during the last few decades. Two stereotypes are
prevalent: girls are not as good as boys in math, and scientific work is better suited to boys and men.”);
see also, e.g., Jo Handelsman et al., Science Faculty’s Subtle Gender Bias Favors Male Students, 109
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. NAT’L SCI. 16474 (2012); Brian A. Nosek, Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony G.
Greenwald, Math = Male, Me = Female, Therefore Math ≠ Me, 83 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 44 (2002); Patrick D. Healy & Sara Rimer, Furor Lingers as Harvard Chief Gives Details
of Talk on Women, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/18/education/furorlingers-as-harvard-chief-gives-details-of-talk-on-women.html
[perma.cc/HVJ8-DCY7]
(“[T]he
Harvard leader suggested he believed that the innate aptitude of women was a factor behind their low
numbers in science and engineering. ‘My best guess, to provoke you, of what’s behind all of this is
that the largest phenomenon—by far—is the general clash between people’s legitimate family desires
and employers’ current desires for high power and high intensity; that in the special case of science
and engineering, there are issues of intrinsic aptitude . . . .’”).
170. See Hernandez v. Muns, No. 96-40087, 1996 WL 661171, at *3 n.6 (5th Cir. Oct. 21,
1996) (“Depending on the factual setting, the same actor inference may be considered in determining
whether a purported prima facie case, resting entirely on circumstantial evidence, has been sufficiently
made out, although more usually the same actor inference will have its primary relevance at a later
stage of the case.”). But see Cordell v. Verizon Commc’ns Inc., 331 F. App’x 56 (2d Cir. 2009)
(applying the same-actor inference in concluding that the claimant had failed to establish a prima facie
case and show that the circumstances gave rise to an inference of discrimination).
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plaintiffs must establish that their employer’s rationale is pretextual. 171 When
applied, the same-actor inference greatly heightens the quantum and quality of
evidence that the plaintiff must produce to survive summary judgment. Some
federal courts reason as if the same-actor doctrine enacts a virtually
insurmountable presumption of nondiscrimination, demanding that the claimant
produce “smoking-gun” evidence of discrimination to survive summary
judgment. In contrast, other courts have concluded that the same-actor
inference is merely evidence for the trier of fact to weigh. In short, the U.S.
Courts of Appeals diverge on the legal effect and analytical significance of the
same-actor inference, 172 and the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to resolve this
divide.
The Second, 173 Fourth, 174 Fifth, 175 Eighth, 176 and Ninth 177 Circuits, for
example, hold that the same-actor doctrine enacts a “strong inference” that the
defendant did not engage in discrimination. These federal courts consider the
same-actor inference very compelling 178 and at times equate the strong
inference to a virtually irrefutable presumption of nondiscrimination, having
explained that the claimant must come forward with “an extraordinarily strong
showing of discrimination” to overcome the “strong inference” of
nondiscrimination. 179 Under this view, plaintiffs must produce direct evidence
of discrimination to survive the same-actor inference applied at summary
judgment, 180 including direct evidence such as statements exhibiting animus. 181

171. See, e.g., Dabney v. Christmas Tree Shops, 958 F. Supp. 2d 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Auguste
v. N.Y. Presbyterian Med. Ctr., 593 F. Supp. 2d 659 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Abouzied v. Roy H. Mann Jr.
H.S. No. 78, No. 97-CV-7613, 2000 WL 1276635 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2000).
172. See Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 573 (6th Cir. 2003).
173. See Grady v. Affiliated Cent., Inc., 130 F.3d 553 (2d Cir. 1997).
174. See Taylor v. Va. Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds
by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
175. See Boyd v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 158 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 1998).
176. See Arraleh v. Cty. of Ramsey, 461 F.3d 967 (8th Cir. 2006).
177. See Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co., 413 F.3d 1090, 1097 (9th Cir. 2005).
178. Some have deemed the inference highly persuasive. See, e.g., Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace
& Co., 104 F.3d 267, 271 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient as a
matter of law to rebut the strong same-actor inference); Lowe v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 963 F.2d 173,
174 (8th Cir. 1992) (“The most important fact here is that plaintiff was a member of the protected age
group both at the time of his hiring and at the time of his firing, and that the same people who hired
him also fired him.”); Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 798 (4th Cir. 1991) (urging the early dismissal of
cases where the same individual both hired and fired the plaintiff).
179. See Crudder v. Peoria Unified Sch. Dist. No. 11, 468 F. App’x 781 (9th Cir. 2012);
Coghlan, 413 F.3d at 1097 (requiring plaintiff to make an “extraordinarily strong showing of
discrimination” to overcome the same-actor inference); see also Antonio v. Sygma Network, Inc., 458
F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2006); Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2000); Lowe, 963 F.2d at
174; Covarrubias v. Brink’s, Inc., No. C05-5196, 2006 WL 3203733 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 3, 2006);
Kassa v. Selland Auto Transp., Inc., No. C05-1304, 2006 WL 2927706 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 11, 2006).
180. See Adams v. Greenbrier Oldsmobile/GMC/Volkswagen, Inc., No. 97-1544, 1999 WL
34907 (4th Cir. Jan. 28, 1999) (reversing district court’s application of the same-actor inference in
granting a Rule 50(a) motion because the plaintiff had presented direct evidence––compelling
evidence of discrimination).
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Nevertheless, in several reported cases, these U.S. Courts of Appeals refused to
set aside application of the same-actor inference where direct evidence in the
record strongly suggested discriminatory animus was afoot. 182 Indeed, in
several reported cases, these circuit courts described the doctrine as enacting an
“anti-animus presumption.” 183 Within these circuits, a minority of panels has
applied the same-actor inference at summary judgment as a weak inference of
nondiscrimination. 184
Returning to our hypothetical, Betty will most likely proffer
circumstantial evidence at summary judgment that Mike failed to promote her
because of her gender, as Betty was otherwise well qualified for the promotion
and there are few female supervisors at the Silicon Valley technology
company. Yet because Mike is the same individual who both hired and failed to
promote her, these courts will apply a strong inference of nondiscrimination. In
this scenario, the technology company will argue that her male coworker was
better qualified for the position than Betty. Applying the same-actor inference
on these facts, absent “smoking gun” evidence of discrimination, Betty will fail
to establish a genuine dispute of material fact of gender discrimination and her
case will be dismissed at summary judgment. A jury will not be granted the
opportunity to weigh the evidence in favor or and against discrimination.
Other U.S. Courts of Appeals, such as the Third 185 and Sixth Circuits, 186
have held that the same-actor inference is not a mandatory presumption but
rather an inference that a federal court may draw at summary judgment. 187 In
several instances, these courts have stated that summary judgment would be
improper if the plaintiff has otherwise raised a genuine issue of material fact. 188
181. See Johnson v. Boys & Girls Clubs of S. Puget Sound, 191 F. App’x 541, 544–45 (9th Cir.
2006).
182. Although several cases had highly derogatory statements in the record, the same-actor
inference was nonetheless applied. See Philbrick v. Holder, 583 F. App’x 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2014)
(“stronger field general”); Peters v. Shamrock Foods Co., 262 F. App’x 30, 32 (9th Cir. 2007) (“a
mom [who] could not travel”); Taylor v. Va. Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 232 (4th Cir. 1999),
abrogated on other grounds by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003); Boyd v. State Farm
Ins. Cos., 158 F.3d 326, 329 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[p]orch [m]onkey,” “[b]uckwheat”); Richmond v.
Johnson, No. 96-6329, 1997 WL 809962, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 18, 1997) (“[W]hat? Are you
pregnant?”).
183. See O’Brien v. Lucas Assocs. Pers., Inc., 127 F. App’x 702, 707 (5th Cir. 2005); see also
Spears v. Patterson UTI Drilling Co., 337 F. App’x 416, 421–22 (5th Cir. 2009).
184. See Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that the
plaintiff “produced no meaningful evidence indicating either that [the employer’s] proffered
explanation was false or that her supervisor harbored discriminatory animus towards her because she
was a woman”); Lowe, 963 F.2d at 174–75 (holding that the same-actor inference warranted summary
judgment because the plaintiff’s evidence of pretext was “thin”).
185. See Waldron v. SL Indus., Inc., 56 F.3d 491, 496 n.6 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that the sameactor inference “is simply evidence like any other and should not be accorded any presumptive value”
(quoting the EEOC’s brief in the case)).
186. See Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 573 (6th Cir. 2003).
187. See id. at 573.
188. See, e.g., id.; Gaglioti v. Levin Grp., Inc., 508 F. App’x 476, 483 (6th Cir. 2012); Idemudia
v. JP Morgan Chase, 434 Fed. Appx. 495 (6th Cir. 2011).
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Of course, the strength of circumstantial evidence is inherently subjective, and
judges’ own experiences may shape their interpretations of how reasonable an
evidentiary inference may be. 189 Under this permutation, a federal court would
be permitted to apply the same-actor inference at summary judgment when
dismissing the plaintiff’s case or at least to consider the same-actor inference
when deciding whether the inference to be drawn from circumstantial evidence
is sufficiently reasonable to be considered by the ultimate trier of fact. Under
this jurisprudential approach, while Betty may not technically be required to
offer direct evidence of discrimination, if a federal district court chooses to
apply the same-actor inference, her circumstantial case of discrimination will
be perceived as less probative and the technology company will likely prevail
at summary judgment. 190
Finally, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have essentially rejected
application of the same-actor doctrine at summary judgment, equating the
same-actor situation to potential evidence of nondiscrimination for the ultimate
trier of fact to consider. 191 The Seventh Circuit has, for example, concluded
that “[t]he ‘common actor’ or ‘same-actor’ inference is a reasonable inference
that may be argued to the jury, but it is not a conclusive presumption that
applies as a matter of law.” 192 These courts have also described the same-actor
doctrine as merely a convenient shorthand that describes the factual scenario in
which a claimant has presented insufficient evidence of discrimination. 193
According to this view, reliance on the same-actor inference to carry the
moving party over the hurdle of summary judgment is legally impermissible,
because drawing legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions and, at
summary judgment, the court must disregard all evidence favorable to the
moving party that the jury is not required to believe. 194 As such, “it is the
province of the jury rather than the court . . . to determine whether the inference
generated by ‘same actor’ evidence is strong enough to outweigh a plaintiff’s
evidence of pretext.” 195

189. See Victor D. Quintanilla, Beyond Common Sense: A Social Psychological Study of
Iqbal’s Effect on Claims of Race Discrimination, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 5 (2011).
190. ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW (2000).
191. See Perez v. Thorntons, Inc., 731 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2013); Nwanna v. Ashcroft, 66 F.
App’x 9 (7th Cir. 2003); Williams v. Vitro Servs. Corp., 144 F.3d 1438 (11th Cir. 1998). Indeed, some
district courts in the Second Circuit have taken this approach when the evidence of gender
discrimination is extremely stark. See, e.g., Braunstein v. Barber, No. 06 Civ. 5978, 2009 WL 849589
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2009), report and recommendation adopted, 2009 WL 1542707 (S.D.N.Y. June 2,
2009).
192. Perez, 731 F.3d at 699, 709; see also Blasdel v. Nw. Univ., 687 F.3d 813, 820 (7th Cir.
2012) (citing Herrnreiter v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 315 F.3d 742, 747 (7th Cir. 2002)).
193. See Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1999).
194. See Petts v. Rockledge Furniture LLC, 534 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2008) (affirming on
alternate ground summary judgment grant of plaintiff’s claim of sex discrimination under Title VII).
195. See Williams, 144 F.3d at 1438 (reversing the grant of summary judgment where former
employee sued under the ADEA, asserting discriminatory discharge and failure to hire claims).
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III.
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE GROWTH RATE OF THE SAME-ACTOR
DOCTRINE
We now turn to an empirical analysis of the same-actor inference,
commencing first with a literature review of prior empirical analyses that have
examined the same-actor doctrine. We then build upon these prior studies by
contributing our own analysis that examines the growth rate in application of
the doctrine at summary judgment by federal district courts nationally and
across federal circuits.
Prior empirical studies have revealed that the doctrine increases case
dismissals at summary judgment. Professor Natasha Martin conducted an
exhaustive empirical legal study on the same-actor inference, 196 investigating
decisions applying the same-actor inference doctrine by the circuit courts and
district courts in 2006, 2007, and 2008.197 Her sample included decisions
adjudicating the same-actor inference under all federal statutes that forbid
employment discrimination. 198 Martin found that the courts of appeals affirmed
the grant of summary judgment for the employer, applying the same-actor
doctrine, in 80 (78.43 percent) out of 102 decisions. Moreover, during this
three-year period, district courts granted summary judgment for employers in
180 (77.58 percent) out of 232 decisions, applying the same-actor doctrine.
Martin flagged that plaintiffs in race and gender cases bore the brunt of the
same-actor inference doctrine when compared to claimants who asserted claims
based on other protected categories. 199 This empirical legal study reveals a
striking trend: when a court adjudicates the same-actor inference, that court
will very likely grant (or affirm the grant of) summary judgment and dismiss
the claimant’s case.
Empirical studies on the same-actor doctrine demonstrate that the
substantive scope of the doctrine is meaningful and significant for the litigation
prospects of claimants aggrieved by discrimination. 200 Given that plaintiffs lose
summary judgment approximately 80 percent of the time when they are unable
to reference favorable intracircuit substantive law on the same-actor doctrine,
these dismal outcomes suggest that, as the doctrine continues to transform,
196. See Natasha T. Martin, Pretext in Peril, 75 MO. L. REV. 313 (2010).
197. Professor Martin reviewed all appellate court opinions addressing the same-actor doctrine,
published and unpublished, available on Westlaw. She also reviewed all federal district court opinions
over the three-year period. She explicitly states that her goal in reviewing these cases was to identify
various trends, including the stages at which the same-actor evidence proves most fatal and under what
circumstances plaintiffs successfully overcome the inference. Id. at 370 n.247.
198. Professor Martin may have included cases applying the same-actor inference that arose
under the Fair Housing Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and alleged
discrimination in the sale of a motor vehicle and unfair labor practices. See id. at 371.
199. See id.
200. See Moss, supra note 148 (suggesting that, when the scope of the same-actor inference
clearly extends to the permutations described in Part II.B.1 and Part II.B.2, the likelihood of summary
judgment increases).
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widen, and expand, it will result in an even larger swath of case dismissals at
summary judgment. In addition, given case-selection effects, we believe that
expansion of the same-actor doctrine poses an access-to-justice problem.
Expansion widens the swath of claimants who are unable to access counsel.
These claimants will, in turn, either drop out of the dispute pyramid when they
are unable to access counsel or they will press on pro se. Throughout the
litigation process, pro se claimants of discrimination fail at a far higher rate
than counseled claimants. 201
While these prior studies depict the rate at which federal district courts
grant summary judgment when the same-actor doctrine is adjudicated in Title
VII cases, we sought to examine empirically the rate at which adjudication of
the same-actor doctrine by federal district courts at summary judgment has
grown over time given the evolving and ever-widening scope of the doctrine.
Thus, we conducted a time-series analysis that examined the growth rate in
application by federal district courts of the same-actor doctrine.
In this regard, we had two primary hypotheses. First, we hypothesized that
the expanding scope of the same-actor inference in Title VII cases would
coincide with a rise in the growth rate in adjudication by federal district courts
of the same-actor doctrine at summary judgment. Second, we hypothesized
that, given the divergence among circuit courts in application of the stronginference standard, the growth rate of the doctrine would diverge across
circuits. Primarily, we predicted that the growth rate of the same-actor doctrine
would be highest within circuits that affirmatively require district courts to
apply the “strong inference of nondiscrimination” standard at summary
judgment, such as the Second Circuit. In contrast, the growth rate would be
lower in circuits that merely allow courts to weigh same-actor evidence at
summary judgment, such as the Sixth Circuit, or in circuits that have sharply
curtailed the same-actor doctrine, such as the Seventh Circuit. 202
A. Method
Our time-series analysis was designed to establish the percentage of
federal district court summary judgment decisions affected by the same-actor
doctrine in Title VII cases. As described in Part I.B.2, much of the “bite” of the
same-actor doctrine operates at summary judgment, where the strong inference
of nondiscrimination results in case dismissals. 203 Rather than examining the
201. See Vivian Berger et al., Summary Judgment Benchmarks for Settling Employment
Discrimination Lawsuits, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 45 (2005); Cheryl R. Kaiser & Victor D.
Quintanilla, Access to Counsel: Psychological Science Can Improve the Promise of Civil Rights
Enforcement, 1 POL’Y INSIGHTS FROM BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 95 (2014); Laura Beth Nielsen et al.,
Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post
Civil Rights United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175, 188–89 (2010).
202. See supra Part I.A.3 and notes 191–93 and accompanying text.
203. See supra Part I.A.3 and notes 170–71 and accompanying text; see also FED. R. CIV. P.
56(a).
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smaller set of published circuit court decisions, our time-series analysis
examined the larger set of federal district court summary judgment
decisions. 204 We employed a twenty-three-year time horizon, collecting all
publicly available federal district court decisions adjudicating motions for
summary judgment in Title VII cases from 1990 to 2013. We established the
annual percentage of total summary judgment decisions affected by the sameactor doctrine by compiling the frequency in which federal district courts
invoked the same-actor doctrine at summary judgment. We then used that
number as the numerator and divided by the total number of summary
judgment decisions in Title VII cases as the denominator.
We first collected all publicly available cases over the twenty-three-year
period from 1990 to 2013 in which federal district courts invoked the sameactor doctrine in Title VII summary judgment decisions. These cases were
retrieved using targeted searches on WestlawNext for both published and
unpublished decisions. 205 We next conducted a second, broader search
designed to collect all publicly available cases over the twenty-three-year
period in which federal district courts adjudicated Title VII claims at summary
judgment. These cases were retrieved using broader, albeit targeted, searches
on WestlawNext for both published and unpublished decisions. 206 In arriving at
the annual percentage of total summary judgment decisions affected by the
same-actor doctrine from 1990 to 2013, we divided the frequency counts of the
decisions collected under the first, targeted search by the frequency counts of
the broader, targeted search of all district courts cases. Finally, to examine the
annual percentage of total summary judgment decisions by federal district
courts affected by the same-actor doctrine within each circuit court, we
combined the decisions of federal district courts within each federal circuit and
stratified the analysis by federal circuit. 207
We then conducted a time-series analysis that investigated the growth rate
in the annual percentage of summary judgment adjudications affected by the
204. The study counted dispositive decisions by federal district courts and those of magistrate
judges. The studies, however, did not count these decisions twice—for example, when both the
magistrate judge decision and the federal district court decision were available and when the district
court judge reviewed the report and recommendation of a magistrate judge.
205. The targeted search parameters for federal district court decisions adjudicating the sameactor inference at summary judgment in Title VII cases was as follows: WL: advanced: ((Title /4 VII)
“42 U.S.C. 2000” “Pub. L. 88-352” “42 USC 2000” “78 Stat. 241” & (employment & discrim!)) &
((same /5 actor common /5 actor) & (infer! OR doct!)) & ((summary /3 judgment) OR (“Rule 56”) OR
(FRCP /3 56) OR (F.R.C.P. /3 56)).
206. In order to circumvent the limited search result capacity of WestlawNext, the study first
narrowed down federal district courts by state and then entered in search parameters tailored to a
certain year. For example, when searching for the decisions adjudicating Title VII claims at summary
judgment in Massachusetts in 1990, the search parameters were as follows: WL > Federal Materials >
1st Circuit > Massachusetts Federal Court > advanced: (((Title /4 VII) “42 U.S.C. 2000” “Pub. L. 88352” “42 USC 2000” “78 Stat. 241” & (employment & discrim!)) & ((summary /3 judgment) OR
(“Rule 56”) OR (FRCP /3 56) OR (F.R.C.P. /3 56))) & DA(aft 12-31-1989 & bef 01-01-1991).
207. The Tables are presented in the Appendix.
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same-actor inference using an AutoRegressive-Integrated-Moving-Average
(ARIMA) time-series method. One benefit of time series analysis is that it
allows one to forecast future events based on past events. Moreover, an
important benefit of the ARIMA method is that it allows one to forecast future
percentages from past events while minimizing the temporal effect of
autocorrelated data on the error terms and reducing the risk of Type I error.
ARIMA modeling involves an iterative process to achieve a white noise series
by taking into account noise parameters such as autoregressive and moving
average terms. 208
In brief, the ARIMA method regards a time series as having three possible
features: stationarity, autoregressiveness, and a moving average. 209 First, the
stationarity aspect of the model entails the extent to which the time series
remains in equilibrium or stable around a constant mean level. Second, the
autoregressive component signifies the degree to which an observation at one
time point is predictable from prior observations, meaning that values above
the long-run average tend to follow values above the average, and values below
the long-run average tend to follow values below that average. 210 For example,
in a first-order autoregressive series, a time observation can be predicted from
the observation immediately prior; therefore, the series may be regressed on
itself one time point in the past. Finally, the moving average aspect of the
model signifies whether the time series lags around a moving average (or
random shocks) in the time series. 211 These three parameters are often labeled
p, d, and q, respectively, and expressed as ARIMA (p, d, q). 212 Below, we
provide our detailed statistical findings in the footnotes and place our narrative
description of the results, along with the growth curves generated, in the body
of the text.

208. Thor Norström, Deriving Relative Risks from Aggregate Data. 1. Theory, 42 J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 333 (1988).
209. See GENE V. GLASS ET AL., DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF TIME-SERIES EXPERIMENTS 78
(Info. Age Publ’g 2008) (1975).
210. See DOUGLAS C. MONTGOMERY ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO TIME SERIES ANALYSIS AND
FORECASTING 5 (2d ed. 2015).
211. See id.
212. ROBERT A. YAFFEE & MONNIE MCGEE, INTRODUCTION TO TIME SERIES ANALYSIS AND
FORECASTING WITH APPLICATIONS OF SAS AND SPSS (2000); Leslie J. McCain & Richard
McCleary, The Statistical Analysis of the Simple Interrupted Time-Series Quasi-Experiment, in
THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION: DESIGN & ANALYSIS
ISSUES FOR FIELD SETTINGS 233 (1979). ARIMA models are defined by the parameters labeled p, d,
and q, expressed as ARIMA (p, d, q). The number of autoregressive terms (p) specifies the extent to
which prior values have an impact on time-series values, meaning that the data are autocorrelated. The
number of nonseasonal differences (d) specifies whether and what type of adjustment is needed to
achieve stationarity, whereby the mean value of the dependent variable remains constant over the
entire time series. The number of lagged forecast errors in the prediction equation (q) specifies whether
an adjustment is needed to account for lagged effects of random shocks in the time series. See Todd M.
Wyatt et al., Population-Level Administration of AlcoholEdu for College: An ARIMA Time Series
Analysis, 18 J. HEALTH COMM. 898 (2013).
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B. Results
This Section first presents the growth rate in the annual percentage of
summary judgment decisions affected by the same-actor inference on a national
basis and then turns to the growth rate in the annual percentage of such cases
on a circuit-by-circuit court basis.
1. Analysis 1: Has the Annual Percentage of Summary Judgment
Decisions Affected by the Same-Actor Doctrine Grown?
We first analyzed the degree to which federal district courts have
increased application of the same-actor doctrine in Title VII cases at summary
judgment. We theorized a rise in the annual rate of invocation of the same-actor
doctrine given the doctrine’s evolution and ever-widening scope, discussed in
Part I.B.1.
As Table 1 in the Appendix reveals, the national frequency at which
federal district courts adjudicate the same-actor doctrine at summary judgment
in Title VII cases has increased annually from 1990 to 2013. Whereas from
1990 to 1994 the same-actor inference doctrine was seldom invoked, from
2000 to 2013 the annual frequency in application of the same-actor doctrine
rose steadily to approximately sixty-four and sixty-three cases per annum in
2012 and 2013, respectively.
We then divided these frequency counts by the total number of summary
judgment adjudications in Title VII cases to derive an annual percentage of
summary judgment cases affected by the same-actor doctrine. We then
employed these annual percentage figures to conduct a time-series analysis
using an ARIMA model. 213 The ARIMA time-series analysis revealed that the
rising growth rate in the percentage of cases affected by the same-actor
inference on a national basis is statistically significant. 214 Moreover, the timeseries analysis, depicted in Figure 1, reveals that, all else being equal, the

213. An ARIMA analysis entails three stages: identify, estimate, and forecast, which
correspond to the stages described by Box and Jenkins. See GEORGE E.P. BOX ET AL., TIME SERIES
ANALYSIS: FORECASTING AND CONTROL (5th ed. 2015). In the identification stage, one identifies the
response series and candidate ARIMA models so as to suggest one or more ARIMA models that may
fit. In the estimation and diagnostic checking stage, one estimates the parameters of the model and
produces diagnostic statistics to help judge the adequacy of the model. In the forecasting stage, one
uses the model to forecast future values of the time series and to generate confidence intervals for
these forecasts. See BARBARA G. TABACHNICK & LINDA S. FIDELL, TIME SERIES ANALYSIS IN USING
MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS ch. 18 (5th ed. 2007).
214. The time-series exhibited statistically significant time-dependent growth. An
ARIMA(2,1,0) model fit using maximum likelihood and given by Yt = .000755 - 1.17Yt-1 - 0.723Yt-2 +
Zt, Zt ~ WN(0, 5.145E-6) was found to best identify the trend as determined by using AIC. Adjusted
R2 = .627, R2 = .668. The Box-Ljung Q statistic, which is distributed according to the chi-square
distribution reveals that the residual autocorrelation for the specified ARIMA model was
nonsignificant for more than 95 percent of lags (Lag 6: Box-Ljung Q = 2.0044, p = .9193; Lag 12:
Box-Ljung Q = 6.52, p = .8878; Lag 18: Box-Ljung Q = 11.94, p = .85 ).
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growth rate will continue to rise. 215 The ARIMA model predicts that the annual
percentage will increase from between 1.39 percent and 2.41 percent in 2015 to
between 1.65 percent and 3.04 percent by 2020.
FIGURE 1.
NATIONAL GROWTH RATE OF DECISIONS AFFECTED
BY THE SAME-ACTOR DOCTRINE

2. Analysis 2: Does the Annual Rate of Decisions Affected by the SameActor Doctrine Differ Across U.S. Courts of Appeals?
We then analyzed the degree to which invocation of the same-actor
doctrine in Title VII summary judgment decisions differs on a circuit-by-circuit
basis. This time-series analysis examines the degree to which the growth rate in
invocation of the same-actor doctrine differs between circuits. We theorized
that the growth rate would differ, chiefly predicting that the growth rate would
be highest in federal circuits that apply the strong inference of
nondiscrimination standard. In contrast, we theorized that the growth rate
would be lower in circuits that allow (rather than require) courts to apply sameactor evidence at summary judgment, such as the Sixth Circuit, and lowest in

215. Prediction intervals for 2015 and 2020 are given by 1.39 percent and 2.41 percent, and
1.65 percent and 3.04 percent, respectively.
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circuits that have sharply curtailed the same-actor doctrine, such as the Seventh
Circuit. 216
As Table 2 in the Appendix reveals, the frequency with which federal
district courts invoke the same-actor doctrine at summary judgment differs
markedly across circuits. Whereas the annual frequency has risen sharply in the
Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, the frequency is much lower in other
circuits, including the Seventh, Eighth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits. The
frequency in the Sixth Circuit lies between these two groups.
Next, we divided these frequency counts by the total number of summary
judgment adjudications in Title VII cases within each U.S. Court of Appeals to
derive an annual percentage of summary judgment cases affected by the sameactor doctrine by circuit. 217 We then conducted ARIMA time-series analyses
that contrasted the growth rate trends in three circuits: the Second, Sixth, and
Seventh Circuits, revealed in Figure 2 below.
FIGURE 2.
GROWTH-RATE MODELS FOR THE SECOND, SIXTH, AND SEVENTH CIRCUITS
A. GROWTH-RATE PROJECTIONS IN SECOND CIRCUIT

216. See supra Part I.3 and notes 191–92 and accompanying text.
217. Tables with both the frequency counts and base rates within each circuit are presented in
the Appendix.
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This ARIMA time-series analysis evidences that in Title VII cases
adjudicated at summary judgment, the same-actor doctrine has been invoked at
different rates across circuits and that the projected growth rate across circuits
differs markedly. The projected difference in application across these three
circuits is statistically significant.
To begin, as Figure 2 depicts, all else being equal, the growth rate in the
Second Circuit will continue to rise. 218 The growth rate has risen sharply in the
Second Circuit and is projected to increase further to between 3.26 percent and
7.23 percent by 2020. 219 This growth rate is theorized to represent the growth
rate in federal circuits that apply the strong-inference-of-nondiscrimination
standard.
In contrast, the rate at which the same-actor doctrine has been invoked at
summary judgment is lower in the Sixth Circuit, where the annual rate is
expected to remain constant at 2.11 percent, and projected to remain between
0.00 percent and 4.48 percent by 2020. 220 Finally, the rate at which the sameactor doctrine has been invoked at summary judgment is least in the Seventh
Circuit, where the annual rate is expected to remain constant at .73 percent, and
projected to remain between 0.00 percent and 1.72 percent by 2020. 221
As revealed, the differential growth rate across circuit courts coincides
with the different jurisprudential implications of the same-actor doctrine across
circuits and the rate at which these courts in these circuits develop new, wider,
and broader permutations of the same-actor doctrine. Consistent with our
hypothesis, the projected doctrinal growth rate is highest in circuits that have
218. Prediction intervals for 2015 and 2020 regarding growth within the Second Circuit are
between 2.38 percent and 6.35 percent, and between 3.26 percent and 7.23 percent, respectively.
219. The time-series in the Second Circuit exhibited statistically significant time-dependent
growth. An ARIMA(0,1,1) model fit using maximum likelihood and given by Yt = .000177 + εt +
.999εt-1, εt ~ WN(0, 0.000105) was found to best identify the trend as determined by using AIC.
Adjusted R2 = .261, R2 = .3045. The Box-Ljung Q statistic, which is distributed according to the chisquare distribution reveals that the residual autocorrelation for the specified ARIMA model was
nonsignificant for more than 95 percent of lags (Lag 6: Box-Ljung Q = 2.114, p = .9089; Lag 12: BoxLjung Q = 8.577, p = .7386).
220. The time-series in the Sixth Circuit exhibited no statistically significant time-dependent
growth. An MA(1) model fit using maximum likelihood and given by Yt = .02108 + εt + εt-1, εt ~
WN(0, 7.376E-5) was found to best identify the relationship between yearly observations as
determined by using AIC. Adjusted R2 = .282, R2 = .3198. The Box-Ljung Q statistic, which is
distributed according to the chi-square distribution reveals that the residual autocorrelation for the
specified ARIMA model was nonsignificant for more than 95 percent of lags (Lag 6: Box-Ljung Q =
2.4847, p = .8702; Lag 12: Box-Ljung Q = 6.3686, p = .8964; Lag 18: Box-Ljung Q = 10.47, p
=.9154).
221. The time-series in the Seventh Circuit exhibited no statistically significant time-dependent
growth. An AR(2) model fit using maximum likelihood and given by Yt = .00728 + 0.1032Yt-1 0.4807Yt-2 + Zt, Zt ~ WN(0, 2.054875E-5), was found to best identify the relationship between yearly
observations as determined by using AIC. Adjusted R2 = .118, R2 = .2065. The Box-Ljung Q statistic,
which is distributed according to the chi-square distribution reveals that the residual autocorrelation for
the specified ARIMA model was nonsignificant for more than 95 percent of lags (Lag 6: Box-Ljung Q
= 3.7567, p = .7096; Lag 12: Box-Ljung Q = 9.4681, p = .6625; Lag 18: Box-Ljung Q = 13.2621, p =
.7758).
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enacted the strong inference of nondiscrimination standard, such as the Second
Circuit. The Second, 222 Fourth, 223 Fifth, 224 and Ninth 225 Circuits hold that the
same-actor doctrine enacts a “strong inference” that the defendant did not
engage in discrimination. These federal courts consider the same-actor
inference very compelling, 226 at times requiring claimants to come forward
with “an extraordinarily strong showing of discrimination” to overcome the
“strong inference” of nondiscrimination. 227
The analysis also reveals that the doctrinal growth rate in the Sixth Circuit
is lower than the Second Circuit. The Sixth Circuit 228 and Third Circuit 229 have
adopted a doctrinal position in the middle holding that the same-actor inference
is not a mandatory presumption but rather evidence that a judge may consider
at summary judgment. Under this approach, a federal court would be permitted
to deploy the same-actor inference at summary judgment when dismissing the
plaintiff’s case.
Finally, the lowest doctrinal growth rate is found in the Seventh Circuit.
The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have rejected application of the same-actor
doctrine at summary judgment, equating the same-actor situation to potential
evidence of nondiscrimination for the ultimate trier of fact to consider. 230 These
U.S. Courts of Appeals have concluded that “[t]he ‘common actor’ or ‘sameactor’ inference is a reasonable inference that may be argued to the jury, but it
is not a conclusive presumption that applies as a matter of law.” 231
Together, these results reveal that the evolving and ever-widening
boundary of the same-actor doctrine coincides with a national growth rate in
invocation of the same-actor doctrine at summary judgment. Our time-series
analysis predicts that, all else being equal, the doctrinal growth rate will
continue to rise. Secondly, the results reveal that the doctrinal growth rate
among the federal circuits that adopt the strong-inference standard is higher
(and is predicted to continue rising) when compared to circuits that have
narrowed the legal effect of the doctrine, or curtailed the same-actor doctrine,
such as the Sixth and Seventh Circuits. Troublingly, the doctrinal growth rate

222. See Grady v. Affiliated Cent., Inc., 130 F.3d 553 (2d Cir. 1997).
223. See Taylor v. Va. Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds
by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
224. See Boyd v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 158 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 1998).
225. See Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co., 413 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2005).
226. See supra note 178.
227. See also supra note 179.
228. See Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 573 (6th Cir. 2003).
229. See Waldron v. SL Indus., Inc., 56 F.3d 491, 496 n.6 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that the sameactor inference “is simply evidence like any other and should not be accorded any presumptive value”
(quoting the EEOC’s brief in the case)).
230. See supra note 191.
231. See supra note 192.
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of the same-actor doctrine is projected to rise into the foreseeable future unless
the doctrine is revisited and curtailed. 232
IV.
RESOLVING THE TENSION BETWEEN THE SAME-ACTOR DOCTRINE AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
In this Part we explore the implications of law and psychological science
on the same-actor doctrine. In so doing, we join with scholars and jurists in the
tradition of calling for accumulated knowledge in the field of psychological
science to be harnessed when designing and evaluating jurisprudence, law, and
public policy. 233 Psychological science has long served as a basis for evaluating
and improving law and public policy. 234 Indeed, the exchange between law,
justice, and science has deep roots in both early 235 and more recent Western
philosophy. 236 As William James once wrote when elucidating philosophical

232. In closing Part III, we note that, because our empirical study harnesses summary judgment
adjudications, the results likely understate the wider consequences of the same-actor doctrine on the
dynamics of civil rights litigation. In particular, plaintiffs’ counsel would likely weigh the implications
of procedural and substantive doctrines when engaging in case selection. See George L. Priest &
Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984); cf. Jonah B.
Gelbach, Note, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on
Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270 (2012). That is, all else being equal, plaintiffs’ counsel
would likely refuse to represent claimants whose claims fall within the central boundaries of the sameactor doctrine. See Kaiser & Quintanilla, supra note 201, at 98–100. Ultimately, these claimants may
choose to abandon their claims or to proceed as pro se claimants. Id. at 96.
233. See, e.g., WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR SOME OLD WAYS OF
THINKING (Cosimo, Inc. 2008) (1907); John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17
(1924); Lawrence, supra note, at 324–26; Kurt Lewin, Action Research and Minority Problems, in
RESOLVING SOCIAL CONFLICTS 201 (Gertrud Weiss Lewin ed., 1948); see also HUNTINGTON
CAIRNS, LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 219 (1935) (“The development of the synthesis of law and
psychology will be a long and perhaps a tedious process; but it is a process, however much patience it
may require, which for the law will yield a fruitful harvest.”).
234. See generally Melvin M. Mark et al., The Past, the Present, and Possible Futures of Social
Psychology and Evaluation, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND EVALUATION 4 (Melvin M. Mark et al.
eds., 2011); see also PETER H. ROSSI, FEEDING THE POOR: ASSESSING FEDERAL FOOD AID (1998);
Donald T. Campbell, Stereotypes and the Perception of Group Differences, 22 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
817 (1967); Kurt Lewin, Action Research and Minority Problems, 2 J. SOC. ISSUES 34 (1946).
235. See generally ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 112 (“The true student of
politics, too, is thought to have studied virtue above all things; for he wishes to make his fellow
citizens good and obedient to the laws. . . [C]learly the student of politics must know somehow the
facts about soul, as the man who is to heal the eyes or the body as a whole must know about the eyes
or the body; and all the more since politics is more prized and better than medicine; but even among
doctors the best educated spent much labour on acquiring knowledge of the body. The student of
politics, then, must study the soul, and must study it with these objects in view . . . .”); ARISTOTLE,
POSTERIOR ANALYTICS (Jonathan Barnes trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1994); FRANCIS BACON,
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING (William Aldis Wright ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1926) (1605); LOCKE,
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 112; PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, supra note 112.
236. See BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL
REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 31 (2007) (“Naturalism is a familiar development
in recent philosophy: indeed, it would not be wrong to say that it is the distinctive development in
philosophy over the last thirty years. . . . [T]raditional philosophical problems are . . . insoluble by the
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pragmatism, “Science and metaphysics would come much nearer together,
would in fact work absolutely hand in hand. . . . Science and critical philosophy
thus burst the bounds of common sense. With science [naïve] realism
ceases.” 237 More recently, Professors Linda Krieger and Susan Fiske
eloquently called on scholars and jurists to consider psychological science
when designing legal doctrine: “[A]s judges develop and elaborate substantive
legal theories, they should guard against basing their analyses on inaccurate
conceptions of relevant, real world phenomena.” 238 They urged jurists, when
elaborating substantive legal theories, to identify advances within the field of
psychological science that offer an empirically supported account of human
behavior, and to contrast these empirically supported accounts with folk
accounts of human nature embedded within the law. 239 Finally, President
Obama has recently issued an executive order calling for psychological and
behavior science to be used in designing government policies that better serve
the American people. 240 Along this vein, Part I and Part II of our Article reveal
epistemic tension between the folk accounts of human behavior animating the
same-actor inference and the accumulated knowledge in the psychological
sciences. Given the widening boundary of the same-actor doctrine and the
doctrine’s troubling growth depicted in Part III, there is pressing need to reflect

a priori, armchair methods of the philosopher, and . . . require, instead, embedding in (or replacement
by) suitable empirical theories.”); see also JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION (1938);
JAMES, supra note 233; W.V. QUINE, Naturalism; or, Living Within One’s Means, in QUINTESSENCE:
BASIC READINGS FROM THE PHILOSOPHY OF W.V. QUINE 275 (Roger F. Gibson, Jr. ed., 2004).
237. JAMES, supra note 233, at 26, 82.
238. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 7, at 1000. Krieger and Fiske advanced a jurisprudential
approach known as behavioral realism. Id. The approach was introduced at a July 2006 symposium
issue discussing how advances in social and cognitive psychology lend new perspective to
jurisprudence under federal nondiscrimination laws and the Equal Protection Clause. In the
symposium, jurists and social and cognitive psychologists produced several noteworthy articles:
Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969 (2006); Krieger &
Fiske, supra note 7; Linda Hamilton Krieger, Behavioral Realism in Law: Reframing the Discussion
About Social Science’s Place in Antidiscrimination Law and Policy, in BEYOND COMMON SENSE,
supra note 112, at 383. For additional discussions of behavioral realism, see, for example, Jerry Kang
et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124 (2012); Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane,
Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465 (2010); Jerry
Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1506 (2005); Kristin A. Lane et al., Implicit
Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427 (2007).
239. Professor Jerry Kang has elaborated a three-step process for this form of inquiry. First, one
identifies psychological science that provides an accurate model of human behavior and decision
making; second, one examines the “common sense” accounts of human behavior and decision making
embedded within law and legal jurisprudence; and third, one accounts for the gap—where the gap is
large, we must pressure law to bridge that gap. See Jerry Kang, Rethinking Intent and Impact: Some
Behavioral Realism About Equal Protection, 66 ALA. L. REV. 627 (2015).
240. See Using Behavioral Sciences to Better Serve the American People, Exec. Order No.
13,707, 80 Fed. Reg. 54697 (signed Sep. 15, 2015) (“To more fully realize the benefits of behavioral
insights and deliver better results at a lower cost for the American people, the Federal Government
should design its policies and programs to reflect our best understanding of how people engage with,
participate in, use, and respond to these policies and programs.”).
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critically on this interstitial doctrine and to examine how it can be readapted to
remain consistent with scientific evidence in the psychological sciences. 241
We return to the implicit theories of human behavior embedded within the
same-actor inference doctrine. As described in Part II, the same-actor doctrine
has been troublingly justified on grounds of common sense and economic
rationality. The common sense justification presupposes an implicit descriptive
theory of human behavior, whereby a decision maker who dislikes members of
a protected group incurs psychological costs by associating with them. This lay
theory suggests that because people who hold biases against stereotyped groups
experience dissonance when closely working with out-group members, these
persons explicitly anticipate, consider, and avoid the dissonance by choosing
not to hire members of stereotyped groups. 242 Regarding economic rationality,
the implicit behavioral theory behind this justification presupposes that, rather
than hiring workers from a group one dislikes and firing them later, an
economically efficient discriminator would refuse to hire stereotyped group
members at all. Under this view, discrimination at termination cannot reflect
how economically rational people actually behave and therefore, discrimination
is unlikely in the everyday.
A. Epistemological Tension Between the “Common Sense”
Underpinnings of the Same-Actor Doctrine and Decades of
Psychological Science on How Bias Manifests
There is marked epistemological tension between the decades of
accumulated psychological science on how stereotypes, prejudice, and
discrimination operate against members of stereotyped groups and the lay
psychological account animating the same-actor doctrine. 243 The “common
sense” explanation of the doctrine is predicated on the lay psychological theory
that people who hold bias against members of stereotyped groups experience
dissonance when working with them and, therefore, choose not to hire them.
That is, this doctrine equates bias to “old-fashioned” prejudice, bias as the overt
psychopathology of immoral and depraved bad actors—bias less frequently
exhibited in society today. Given that the strong inference of nondiscrimination
operates as a decisive defense, and licenses other forms of biased treatment, the
doctrine is predicated on a folk account which presumes that Title VII prohibits
only blatant, overt, and animus-laden discrimination. Yet, psychological
science has shown that stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination affect
members of stigmatized groups far more pervasively than this account
presumes. Stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination are the result of common
psychological processes; and this bias is, in fact, pervasive against members of
stigmatized groups. Indeed, most majority-group members in American society
241.
242.
243.

See Krieger & Fiske, supra note 7, at 1000.
See supra Part I.
See Krieger & Fiske, supra note 7, at 1039–52.
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hold implicit bias in favor of their own majority-group and against minoritygroup members. Therefore, the pivotal question is not whether an actor holds
bias, but rather whether the particular features of a context, situation,
institution, or system are designed to curtail or cause the manifestation of
implicit bias against members of stereotyped groups. Mainly, psychological
science reveals that it is highly plausible for a person who holds bias against a
member of a protected group to nonetheless hire a woman or minority, given
the unique situational demands at the hiring stage, and later express disparate
treatment against that same woman or minority at a subsequent employment
stage.
Dual process perspectives on prejudice posit that the expression of
implicit bias occurs automatically, with little awareness, control, and
intention. 244 Implicit bias is likely to manifest when situations afford discretion
and subjectivity because these contexts provide many potential reasons for a
given decision, and individuals may believe that they are objective when, in
fact, they are influenced by implicit biases and stereotypes. 245 However, people
can override bias with an egalitarian response when they are motivated to be
unbiased. For example, when people are aware of their propensity to express
implicit bias, they may allocate more attention to regulating their decisions so
that they behave in a more egalitarian manner. 246 Yet, even those who truly
desire to behave unbiasedly may express bias when they are cognitively taxed
(e.g., multitasking, performing a complex task, etc.) and cannot garner
sufficient mental resources to override biased decision making. Importantly,
rather than primarily relying on individuals to regulate their own biases,
situations can be designed to reduce the potential for implicit bias to emerge.
Typically, these situational interventions involve minimizing the subjectivity
laden in decision making, effectively rooting out bias where it is most likely to
operate unjustly.
Dovidio and Gaertner, for example, conducted a laboratory experiment
that examined reactions to black and white job applicants with very strong,

244. See id. at 1041; Timothy D. Wilson et al., A Model of Dual Attitudes, 107 PSYCHOL. REV.
101, 104 (2000).
245. See MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF
GOOD PEOPLE (2013); Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 58; Dovidio & Gaertner, Aversive Racism,
supra note 51; Dovidio et al., supra note 46; Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 6; Dovidio & Gaertner,
supra note 52; Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific
Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945 (2006).
246. See Patricia G. Devine et al., Long-Term Reduction in Implicit Race Bias: A Prejudice
Habit-Breaking Intervention, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1267 (2012); Patricia G. Devine,
Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 5 (1989); Patricia G. Devine et al., The Regulation of Explicit and Implicit Race Bias: The
Role of Motivations to Respond Without Prejudice, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 835 (2002);
Margo J. Monteith et al., Putting the Brakes on Prejudice: On the Development and Operation of Cues
for Control, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1029 (2002).
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moderate, or very weak qualifications. 247 When applicants’ qualifications were
either very strong or very weak, black and white applicants were recommended
as hires at equivalent rates. In these situations, the clarity of the candidate’s
qualifications was so straightforward that there was little opportunity for
subjective decision making. However, when applicants’ qualifications were
moderate, white applicants were hired more frequently than black applicants. 248
Further, for white applicants, there was a jump in hiring recommendations from
6 percent when they had low qualifications to 76 percent when they had
moderate qualifications; that is, moderately qualified whites were hired threequarters of the time. In contrast, black applicants saw an increase from 13
percent when they had low qualifications to 45 percent when they had
moderate qualifications; that is, identically moderately qualified blacks were
hired less than half of the time. When there was room for discretion and
subjectivity (when black and white applicants had moderate qualifications),
white applicants were given the benefit of the doubt, whereas black applicants
were not.
Similar discretionary contexts have yielded bias in experimental audit
studies in labor markets. In a study of labor markets in Chicago and Boston, for
example, 249 Bertrand and Mullainathan sent identical resumes with either
clearly white-sounding names (e.g., Greg Baker) or African Americansounding names (e.g., Jamal Jones) in response to posted employment ads. The
resumes were experimentally varied to be strong or weak. Overall, white
applicants received 50 percent more callbacks than African Americans. Given
that the only attribute to vary across resumes was the name of the applicants,
this finding shows clear evidence of discrimination against black job
applicants. Additionally, white applicants with stronger resumes received 30
percent more callbacks than white applicants with weaker resumes. However,
African American applicants with stronger resumes received only 9 percent
more callbacks than African Americans with weaker resumes. This latter
finding highlights that employers did not attend to strong qualifications in
African Americans’ resumes, which is consistent with decades of laboratory
research showing that stereotypes can prevent people from noticing counterstereotypical information (the same competence-related attribute is noticed
when applied to Whites, but neglected when applied toward African
Americans) and can cause them to reinterpret that information in a less
favorable light (e.g., view the same information as diagnostic of competency
for whites, but as nondiagnostic for African Americans).

247. See Dovidio & Gaertner, Aversive Racism, supra note 51, at 319–23.
248. See id.
249. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable
than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV.
991 (2004).
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Taken together, these and many other 250 psychological studies establish
that when situations afford subjectivity and discretion, that is, when decisions
entail ambiguous criteria or performance credentials, implicit bias may operate,
prompting members of majority groups to favor members of their own
group. 251 Decision makers do not perceive this in-group favoring as bias
because the ambiguity in these contexts allows them to rationalize these
decisions in ways that seem fair and impartial. 252 These biases are subtle, and
even well-intentioned people who make biased decisions may honestly
convince themselves that their decisions were based on neutral and legitimate
criteria rather than bias. 253 This logic is incorrect given that the experimental
studies in the lab and labor market are tightly controlled, meaning that the only
possible reason for favoring a white applicant is the candidate’s racial group
membership.
The expression of implicit bias is not inevitable, however, and the second
stage of dual process theories of social cognition addresses how implicit bias
can be overcome and corrected. Indeed, this second stage of the dual process
model is crucial for determining whether people will correct their decision
making and halt the operation of bias. In this stage, individuals’ personal
beliefs and motivations come into play. When people are motivated to be
unbiased and have sufficient cognitive abilities to enact this motivation, they
will consider their decision through the lens of egalitarian values and will
behave without bias. 254 This motivation to be unbiased can stem from
differences in individuals’ internalized racial attitudes or from external sources.
External sources of this egalitarian motivation include social norms about being
unbiased or workplace procedures that create oversight and accountability,
leading individuals to slow down their processing and make careful
decisions. 255 When situations enhance the motivation and ability to control
bias, people can exert control over their own implicit bias, helping them make
fair decisions. Stated another way, whether implicit bias will manifest against
members of stigmatized groups will be situationally and contextually
aggravated, influenced, or attenuated. Discrimination may be exacerbated or

250. See BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 245; Corrine A. Moss-Racusin et al., Science
Faculty’s Subtle Gender Biases Favor Male Students, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 16474 (2012).
251. See, e.g., Russell H. Fazio, Multiple Processes by Which Attitudes Guide Behavior: The
MODE Model as an Integrative Framework, in 23 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 75 (Mark. P. Zanna ed., 1990); Krieger & Fiske, supra note 7, at 1039–42.
252. See Biernat & Fuegen, supra note 120; Phelan et al., supra note 120.
253. See Hodson et al., supra note 59, at 461.
254. See Devine, supra note 246; Monteith et al., supra note 246.
255. See Gilbert, supra note 39; Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social
Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4 (1995); Daniel Kahneman
& Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341 (1984); Eliot R. Smith &
Jamie DeCoster, Dual-Process Models in Social and Cognitive Psychology: Conceptual Integration
and Links to Underlying Memory Systems, 4 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 108 (2000).
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inhibited depending on the conditions in a situation and context. 256 Situations
may constrain the relationship between prejudice and bias, and powerfully
curtail the degree to which bias is expressed.
One of the earliest social science studies on discrimination illuminates this
“person x situation interaction” and underscores how unreasonable it is to infer
that an actor who hires a member of a stereotyped group harbors no animosity
toward that group. 257 In this classic study, sociologist Richard LaPiere
accompanied a Chinese couple to 251 hotels across the United States during the
early 1930s. At each hotel, the group asked if they could be given a room or
served a meal. Despite the marked anti-Chinese sentiment that characterized
this time period in the United States, LaPiere and the couple were denied
service only once. To investigate whether these positive behaviors represented
a lack of bias toward the Chinese, LaPiere sent letters to these hotels six
months after their visit asking if they would accept Chinese people in their
establishments. In contrast to the positive reception received on actual visits, 92
percent of the businesses replied that they would not serve the Chinese.
Why would people who readily acknowledge their prejudice toward the
Chinese actually fail to express behavior consistent with that prejudice in an
actual interaction with Chinese guests? One reason for this disconnect between
bias and behavior stemmed from the power of social situations in overriding
dispositions and internally held attitudes. When the Chinese couple requested
services, there was a strong situational norm to provide those services and to
help potential patrons. Denying someone service requires publicly breaking
service norms, something that many individuals find aversive and are reluctant
to do. Thus, when the Chinese couple visited in person, the predominant norm
to provide service may have been sufficiently powerful to override individuals’
attitudes toward the Chinese. In addition, LaPiere’s presence with his Chinese
guests likely mitigated the expression of bias in situ. In short, the decision to
allow the Chinese couple access in one instance had little bearing on the
marked prejudice that these establishments harbored against this minority
group. In the eight decades since, social scientists have systematically shown
that situational factors can exacerbate or inhibit bias. 258

256. See, e.g., Krieger & Fiske, supra note 7, at 1050 (“Whether biased decision makers will
act in a way that expresses their bias varies as a function of many different variables, including the
influence of social norms, the extent to which particular social norms are made salient in particular
situations, decision makers’ perceptions of control, their motivation to avoid biased decision making,
and the apparently relevant information they have at their disposal.”).
257. Richard T. LaPiere, Attitudes Vs. Actions, 13 SOC. FORCES 230 (1934).
258. BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 245; ALICE H. EAGLY, SEX DIFFERENCES IN SOCIAL
BEHAVIOR: A SOCIAL-ROLE INTERPRETATION (1987); Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald,
On the Malleability of Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired
and Disliked Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 800 (2001); Nilanjana Dasgupta &
Shaki Asgari, Seeing Is Believing: Exposure to Counterstereotypic Women Leaders and Its Effect on
the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotyping, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 642 (2004);
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Regarding the second stage of the dual-process model, a supervisor who
must make an employment decision in a context in which egalitarian norms are
salient and in which discretion is cabined may not engage in discrimination,
even though the supervisor harbors bias toward minorities or women. The folk
depiction presumes that a person who holds bias at the hiring stage will be
motivated to act on that bias and will do so irrespective of any criteria,
expectations, norms, and constraints that operate at the hiring stage. This
“common sense” account that people who hold bias would not hire minorities
or women is deeply mistaken.
“Common sense” notwithstanding, it is not altogether inconceivable that
an initial hiring decision may reflect the distinct possibility that a woman or
minority was, in fact, the most highly qualified candidate. Indeed, despite bias
against women in STEM, female computer programmers rank among the most
celebrated scientists in the world, including Ada Lovelace (who is often
regarded as the first computer programmer in the world), Grace Hooper (who is
credited with helping to create the COBALT computer language and the word
“debugging”), and Megan Smith (chief technology officer of the United
States), among many others. 259 Moreover, some workplaces may implement
well-designed, formalized hiring criteria, leaving little discretion for
supervisors to reject well-qualified women or minorities in the applicant pool.
Further, despite harboring bias, HR managers may hire female or minority
applicants to obtain the material, presentational benefits of diversity, which
include signaling to clients, customers, prospective employees, and investors
that the firm values diversity. Nancy Leong has powerfully argued that, at the
hiring stage, firms may behave as if diversity is good business to obtain these
signaling benefits. 260
Indeed, there are many cases that illustrate situations which prompted the
hiring of women and minorities, regardless of potentially biased decision
makers at the hiring stage. For example, an initial hiring decision may reflect
an employer’s desire to have a position expeditiously filled due to a pressing

Fiske, supra note 6; Monteith et al., supra note 246; Jennifer A. Richeson & Nalini Ambady, Effects of
Situational Power on Automatic Racial Prejudice, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 177 (2003).
259. Indeed, among the most powerful people in the world are women who lead Fortune 500
technology companies, including Sheryl Sandberg (COO, Facebook), Safra Catz (Co-CEO, Oracle),
Marissa Mayer (CEO and President, Yahoo), Susan Wojcicki (CEO, YouTube, Google), Ruth Porat
(SVP and CFO, Google & Alphabet), Bridget Van Kralingen (SVP, IBM Global Business Services,
IBM), and Diane Bryant (SVP & General Manager, Data Center Group, Intel). See Kristen Bellstrone
et. al., Fortune’s 50 Most Powerful Women List 2015, 172 FORTUNE MAG. 90 (2015). Further, many
brilliant female computer programmers who began careers at Google now lead start-up companies in
Silicon Valley: Claire Hughes Johnson (COO, Stripe), Francoise Casals Brougher (Global Suiness
Lead, Square), Stacy Brown-Philpot (COO, TaskRabbit), Katie Stanton (VP Global Media, Twitter),
Natalie Fair (Head of Finance, Pinterest), Sukhinder Singh Cassidy (CEO, Joyus), April Underwood
(Head of Platform, Slack), and Amy Chang (CEO, Accompany). See Patricia Sellers, The Google
Effect, 172 FORTUNE MAG. 110 (2015).
260. See Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151 (2013).
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need in the short term by a skilled employee. 261 When the exigent need passes,
an employer may later fire the skilled claimant and fill the position with a
majority-group member whom the employer favors. 262 Further, a workplace
may have a strong organizational norm about rehiring employees on renewable
annual contracts. As such, a manager may rehire an employee due to this
organizational norm but later fire that employee based on bias. Indeed, in the
latter scenario, an employer who desires to discriminate may face less
resistance in firing than refusing to rehire the employee. 263 Moreover, a highlevel manager may be technically responsible for both hiring and firing
employees, yet substantive decisions may be made by low-level managers, with
the high-level manager largely accepting the recommendation of subordinates.
In this scenario, the high-level manager’s behavior reflects bureaucratic
compartmentalization, with the substantive recommendations below tainted by
bias. 264 Finally, federal courts have extended the “hiring” prerequisite to
scenarios in which a supervisor provides an employee an average, rather than a
poor, review. Similarly, there are many reasons why a supervisor may provide
an employee an average review, rather than a poor review. The average review
might in fact reflect the employee’s actual performance on the job. 265 These
examples, and countless more, underscore the incompleteness of the lay theory
that when employers hire members of stereotyped groups they must necessarily
like them and hold no bias toward them.
Finally, female and minority applicants may successfully circumnavigate
the effect of stereotypes at the hiring stage; they may successfully self-present a
less racially salient or a less stereotypical working identity to avoid stereotypes,
such as by “resume whitening,” a phenomenon that Devon Carbado and Mitu
Gulati, among others, have explored. 266 While bias against these employees
may be less acute at the hiring stage, prejudice may emerge against them at
later stages of the employment relationship when employment difficulties
arise. 267 Here, Carbado and Gulati’s scholarship has revealed that bias is not

261. See Spears v. Patterson UTI Drilling Co., 337 F. App’x 416 (5th Cir. 2009).
262. See id.; Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795 (6th Cir. 1996).
263. See Sreeram v. La. State Univ. Med. Ctr.-Shreveport, 188 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 1999)
(affirming grant of summary judgment on Title VII claim alleging discriminatory discharge based on
national origin and gender).
264. See Ako-Doffou v. Univ. of Tex., No. 02-51287, 2003 WL 21417478 (5th Cir. June 3,
2003) (affirming grant of summary judgment against plaintiff who was hired by the University of
Texas at San Antonio (UTSA) as visiting professor of finance, then renewed in tenure-track position.
UTSA refused to reappoint claimant for a third year).
265. See Idemudia v. J.P. Morgan Chase, 434 F. App’x 495 (6th Cir. 2011).
266. See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 8, at 15–16 (quoting Michael Luo, “Whitening” the
Résumé, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2009, at WK3); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 1710, 1712 (1993) (describing the painful memories recounted by her grandmother of concealing
her racial identity to gain entry into a workplace).
267. See Krieger & Fiske, supra note 7, at 1039–40. With regard to women in male-dominated
workplaces, sociological evidence reveals that negative workplace social climates can lead to
physiological stress responses. See Catherine J. Taylor, “Relational by Nature?” Men and Women Do

58

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 104:1

evenly distributed among all members of a stereotyped group. 268 There is farranging variability among the psychological, physical, and social dimensions
within minority groups, 269 and an individual’s experience with discrimination
will vary considerably as a function of where they reside on the spectrum of
these within-category features. For example, African Americans with more
phenotypic stereotypic features (e.g., darker skin tone, wider noses, fuller lips)
are more likely to be stereotyped and subjected to bias in both the lab and
field. 270 Racial minorities who are more highly identified with their racial
group (those whose racial group membership is central to their self-concept)
are more likely to experience discrimination compared to minorities who are
less racially identified. 271 For example, social psychological experiments have
demonstrated that strongly identified racial minorities (e.g., those who
mentioned belonging to a racial affinity group) were evaluated more negatively
by whites compared to identically portrayed minorities who did not express
their racial identification (e.g., those who mentioned belonging to a social
group unrelated to their racial background). 272 While minorities may selfpresent to avoid bias at the hiring stage, prejudice may emerge against them
after entering the workplace. As Linda Krieger has noted, “Intergroup bias does
not function as a stable trait or preference that expresses consistently across all
situations.” 273

Not Differ in Physiological Response to Social Stressors Faced by Token Women, 122 AM. J.
SOCIOLOGY (forthcoming); Bianca Manago & Catherine J. Taylor, Occupational Sex-Composition
and Chronic Physiological Stress Exposure (draft on file with author).
268. See Blair et al., supra note 8; Michael Hughes & Bradley R. Hertel, The Significance of
Color Remains: A Study of Life Chances, Mate Selection, and Ethnic Consciousness Among Black
Americans, 68 SOC. FORCES 1105 (1990); Kaiser & Pratt-Hyatt, supra note 8, at 432–34; Kaiser &
Wilkins, supra note 8; Sei Jin Ko et al., What the Voice Reveals: Within- and Between-Category
Stereotyping on the Basis of Voice, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 806 (2006); Keith B.
Maddox, Perspectives on Racial Phenotypicality Bias, 8 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 383
(2004); Eric Uhlmann et al., Subgroup Prejudice Based on Skin Color Among Hispanics in the United
States and Latin America, 20 SOC. COGNITION 198 (2002); Clara L. Wilkins et al., Detecting Racial
Identification: The Role of Phenotypic Prototypicality, 46 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1029
(2010).
269. Within a single stereotyped group, members of that group will differ from each other on a
variety of dimensions, including phenotypic stereotypicality (the extent to which they physically
resemble the prototype of their group, such as dark skin tone among African Americans), social class,
education, national origin, religion, language and accent, gender, sexual orientation, and psychological
identification with that group. See Kaiser & Wilkins, supra note 8, at 472.
270. For example, empirical studies on death-eligible federal defendants have revealed that
more phenotypical African American murder defendants are more likely than less phenotypically
stereotypic African American defendants to be sentenced to death, and this persists after controlling
for a range of variables concerning the crimes. See Blair et al., supra note 8; Eberhardt et al., supra
note 8, at 385.
271. See Kaiser & Pratt-Hyatt, supra note 8, at 443–44; Cheryl R. Kaiser et al., Nonverbal
Asymmetry in Interracial Interactions: Strongly Identified Blacks Display Friendliness, but Whites
Respond Negatively, 2 SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 554 (2011).
272. See Kaiser & Pratt-Hyatt, supra note 8, at 443–44.
273. See Krieger, supra note 238, at 393.
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In the end, this “common sense” account is too simplistic and incomplete
to support legitimate legal doctrine that has material consequences on those
who experience discrimination. Indeed, there are countless internal and
external reasons for hiring a woman or a minority that have no bearing on
whether one “likes” or “dislikes” protected groups.
B. Epistemological Tension Between the “Economic Rationality”
Underpinnings and Psychological Science on Moral Licensing
The same-actor doctrine has also been justified on grounds of economic
rationality. This implicit theory has two strands. In the first, an employer
engages in economically irrational conduct when terminating an employee for
discriminatory reasons. Therefore, it would be exceedingly unlikely for an
employer to discriminate when firing an employee. After all, the transaction
costs required to hire and train a new employee would disincentivize arbitrary
discrimination in the workplace. Under this view, after hiring a female or
minority employee, a rational employer would not terminate that female or
minority employee for discriminatory reasons. This economic rationality
argument, therefore, bridges from an implicit normative theory of behavior
(economic rationality) to the implicit descriptive behavioral theory that
employers, as a matter of fact, do not engage in workplace discrimination. In
the second strand, because the marginal cost of discrimination increases at later
stages in an employment relationship (e.g., rehiring and retraining), a rational
racist (or sexist) would discriminate at hiring rather than at later employment
stages. Both strands underpin the belief that discrimination against women and
minorities within American workplaces is extremely unlikely. To be sure, there
are many flaws with these arguments, and the theory animating this concern is
not new. Indeed, these arguments were quite en vogue in the 1960s and have
been contested ever since. 274 Psychological science conducted over the past
two decades underscores additional reasons to discredit the economic
irrationality underpinnings of the same-actor inference of nondiscrimination.
To begin, even if discrimination should be irrational as a normative
matter, decades of behavioral economics have demonstrated that people
systematically vary from the idealized accounts of economically rational
decision making. Humans are boundedly rational: they may behave in
economically rational ways in some contexts, but they systematically and
routinely act irrationally across many contexts as a result of heuristics,
stereotypes, biases, and prejudices. There are systematic pitfalls and

274. See BECKER, supra note 61; GEORGE EATON SIMPSON & J. MILTON YINGER, RACIAL
CULTURAL MINORITIES: AN ANALYSIS OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION (rev. ed. 1958);
Howard Schuman & John Harding, Prejudice and the Norm of Rationality, 27 SOCIOMETRY 353
(1964).
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shortcomings in social judgment. 275 As such, whether employers, in fact,
engage in workplace discrimination is a descriptive empirical question, one that
need not be deduced a priori from normative theories about how rational actors
ought to behave under idealized conditions. 276
On this score, the descriptive theory of homoeconomicus fails to connect
with the pervasive, accumulated evidence of discrimination against members of
stereotyped groups in the current American workplace. While actors should
behave as if discrimination is economically irrational, within American
workplaces discrimination nevertheless persists. Troublingly, recent social
psychological research has evidenced that between 20 percent and 40 percent
of employers discriminate against members of a legally protected class. 277
Further, a study of the American public revealed that, from 1997 to 2001, 18
percent to 21 percent of African Americans reported that they were
discriminated against at their place of work within the last thirty days. 278 In this
study, “[31 percent of blacks and Hispanics] reported being ‘passed over for a
promotion which went to a white [employee]’ because of racial
discrimination.” 279 Indeed, African Americans and Hispanics with higher levels
of education reported experiencing higher levels of discrimination compared to
other respondents. 280 Further, within the United States, gender- and race-based
income inequities persist. 281 Female wage earners have an average salary of
$33,900 per year, whereas males average $47,700 per year. 282 African
American households earn an average salary of $22,500 less per year than
white households, while Latino households earn about $16,500 less than
whites. 283 Moreover, rates of unemployment are more than twice as high for
African Americans relative to whites, and unemployment rates are significantly
higher for Latinos compared to whites. 284
Further, psychological science reveals the error of presupposing that
actors avoid discrimination by making economically rational decisions. As
discussed in Part I.B and Part IV.A, bias against women and minorities
operates in less blatant ways than theorized especially when decision makers
275. RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS
OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980); ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 30; Smith & Collins, supra note 30.
276. See SEN, supra note 121, at 176–78; see also BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 11–58
(Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 255.
277. Bendick & Nunes, supra note 116, at 244–45.
278. See Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 108, at 17 (citing TOM W. SMITH, UNIV. OF CHI.,
MEASURING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION 24 (2002)).
279. Id. (citing SMITH, supra note 278, at 28).
280. Id.
281. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
CURRENT POPULATION REP. NO. P60-239, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE
IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010 (2011); Nier & Gaertner, supra note 4.
282. DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 281.
283. Id.
284. News Release No. USDL-12-0012, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, The
Employment Situation—December 2011 (Jan. 9, 2012).

2016]

THE SAME-ACTOR INFERENCE OF NONDISCRIMINATION

61

use subjective and ambiguous criteria, or when decision makers fail to exert the
effort necessary to reach egalitarian decisions. Further, psychological science
on moral licensing reveals the error of presuming that the psychology of hiring
applicants is necessarily equivalent to an employer’s behavior toward
employees within the workplace. Studies on moral licensing reveal the hazard
that a firing decision following a hiring decision stems from bias. The act of
hiring a black candidate, even an exceptionally qualified one, as was the case in
the Monin and Miller (2001) experiment, 285 can result in subsequent racially
biased decision making toward the same and other black candidates. A
supervisor who feels licensed as egalitarian and nonprejudiced (because he or
she hired the first black employee) may decide to fire or discipline the same or
another black employee for an action (e.g., inadequate performance, negative
interpersonal behavior, tardiness), but choose not to similarly fire or discipline
a white employee who engages in the same action. Indeed, it is well established
that supervisors provide more second chances to in-group members than outgroup members. 286
Research on moral licensing also reveals that the psychology behind
hiring and firing decisions differs because these decisions are made on a caseby-case basis: when an individual employee’s actions are considered in
isolation, rather than in direct comparison to other employees. For example,
when considering the scenario involving the firing of Jason, the manager,
Mike, weighed the seriousness of Jason’s actions and decided whether they
were sufficient to warrant disciplinary action. Mike was not comparing Jason’s
actions to similar actions of others and determining which is worse; rather
Jason’s actions were considered in isolation. In these situations, managers have
greater discretion to conclude that a given action requires disciplinary action or
dismissal. This discretion can result in the manifestation of implicit bias against
minorities who experience greater punishment than nonminorities although
they both are engaging in similar negative actions. 287 Indeed, it is much more
difficult to recognize the operation of discriminatory animus in a case-by-case
decision as compared to pool-based decision making. 288 Thus, the moral
licensing effect of hiring a black employee may increase the likelihood that a
supervisor will make adverse decisions against that black employee, other
black employees, or other members of stigmatized groups. At the same time, a
supervisor may convince themselves and others that these disparities stem from

285. Monin & Miller, supra note 22.
286. See Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 108, at 18 (citing K.A. DIXON, DUKE STOREN & CARL
E. VAN HORN, JOHN J. HELDRICH CTR. FOR WORKPLACE DEV., A WORKPLACE DIVIDED: HOW
AMERICANS
VIEW
DISCRIMINATION
AND
RACE
ON
THE
JOB
(2002),
http://www.heldrich.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/products/uploads/A_Workplace_Divided.pdf); see
also Norton et al., supra note 58.
287. See George S. Bridges & Sara Steen, Racial Disparities in Official Assessments of Juvenile
Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 554 (1998).
288. See Kaiser & Pratt-Hyatt, supra note 8; Kaiser et al., supra note 271.
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rational reasons. In sum, well-intentioned people, even people who have made
a decision that favors a black employee, are susceptible to engaging in biased
decision making when they have discretion to justify their behavior in unbiased
ways. 289
Case law reveals many instances where bias operates after an employee is
hired. Indeed, as the Seventh Circuit in Johnson v. Zema articulated, there are
many reasons why someone who holds animus toward a protected group may
nonetheless hire a minority-group member. For example, a manager might hire
a person of a certain race expecting not to have frequent contact with them
given their respective positions within the company. Or an employer might hire
an employee of a certain gender expecting that person to act, or dress, or talk in
a way the employer deems acceptable for that gender but then fire that
employee if he or she fails to comply with the employer’s gender-based
stereotypes. 290 Similarly, if an employee were the first African American hired,
an employer might be unaware of his or her own stereotypical views of African
Americans at the time of hiring.
Moreover, social scientists have demonstrated many circumstances in
which employers behave as if discrimination is economically rational. 291
Sociological evidence reveals that employers discriminate against employees
who fail to assimilate, including employees who exhibit a racially salient
working identity in the workplace. 292 For example, employers rationalize their
actions as economically necessary given the sensibilities of customers or
employees. 293 In addition, employers often assign female and minority
employees more onerous or less prestigious assignments that lend less potential
for advancement. 294 In so doing, employers rationalize the allocation of scarce
opportunities (or less prestigious assignments) by the need to invest in
employees with the most leadership potential. Sociological evidence also
reveals that employers often discriminate against women who become
pregnant295 and employees who fail to conform to normative schemas,
289. See NANCY DITOMASO, THE AMERICAN NON-DILEMMA: RACIAL INEQUALITY WITHOUT
RACISM (2013).
290. Dasgupta v. Harris, 407 F. App’x 325 (10th Cir. 2011).
291. See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 8, at 77–78 (discussing plausible economically
rational arguments describing bias exhibited in Rogers v. American Airlines).
292. See id.
293. See, e.g., United States v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., No. 04-CV-4237, 2010 WL 3855191
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2010).
294. See THE GLASS CEILING IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra notes 26 and 27.
295. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012)); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (2015); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125 (1976), superseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555,
92 Stat. 2076 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012)), as recognized by Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983). See generally Shelley J. Correll, Stehan Benard & In Paik, Getting a
Job: Is there a Motherhood Penalty?, 112 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1297, 1332–33 (2007) (“In this project,
we make two main contributions. First, we isolate and experimentally evaluate a status-based
discrimination mechanism that is proposed to explain some of the disadvantages mothers experience

2016]

THE SAME-ACTOR INFERENCE OF NONDISCRIMINATION

63

stereotypes, and scripts about how women 296 or members of stereotyped groups
should present themselves in the workplace. 297 Employers have rationalized
discrimination against women and minorities as necessary to preserve the
employer’s corporate image. 298 Finally, employers have rationalized
discrimination against women who complain of masculine cultures in computer
programming workplaces. 299
Returning to our first hypothetical involving Betty who sought a
promotion, if initial hiring decisions reflect a lack of bias, then one would
anticipate that, all else being equal, women would climb the corporate ladder at
rates commensurate with men. The well-documented dearth of women in toplevel positions in all types of organizations, however, suggests that something
along the career pathway impedes women from advancing as quickly and
successfully as men. 300 This top-level gender imbalance is undoubtedly multidetermined, with factors including disparate motherhood disadvantaging
women’s ascent. Even so, aside from motherhood penalties, discrimination
against women also hinders their advancement. Compared to men, women are
less likely to be thought of as leaders, further slowing their ascent up the
ladder. 301 Further, when women display the behaviors people expect of leaders,
such as self-promotion, their efforts are met with resistance and backlash, and

in the paid labor market. . . . The second contribution we make in this project is to show that real
employers discriminate against mothers.”); Daniela M. de la Piedra, Comment, Flirting with the PDA:
Congress Must Give Birth to Accommodation Rights that Protect Pregnant Working Women, 17
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 275 (2008).
296. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Tit. I, § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1075 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m) (2012)), as
recognized in Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014). See generally Joel Wm. Friedman,
Gender Nonconformity and the Unfulfilled Promise of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 14 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 205 (2007).
297. See Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See generally
Paulette M. Caldwell, Intersectional Bias and the Courts: The Story of Rogers v. American Airlines, in
RACE LAW STORIES 571, 573 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon Wayne Carbado eds., 2008); Crenshaw,
supra note 106, at 139–40; Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of
Analysis Under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079, 1093 (2010).
298. See, e.g., N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 2010 WL 3855191.
299. See, e.g., Amy Gray, ‘Titstare’ App at Techcrunch: Women in Tech Deserve Better,
THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 8, 2013, 10:58 PM) http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013
/sep/09/titstare-app-women-tech-sexism [perma.cc/UF3Q-TLLV] (“When developers are allowed
to showcase apps which ‘let you stare at tits’ during a conference, you know gender inclusivity in
the industry remains wishful thinking.”); Interview with Julia Ann Horvath, MODEL VIEW
CULTURE (Sept. 15, 2015), https://modelviewculture.com/pieces/interview-with-julie-ann-horvath
[perma.cc/NB8C-G8BQ] (“[T]he moment you raise your hand and say I think this is wrong, you
are immediately excommunicated . . . .”).
300. NANCY M. CARTER ET AL., CATALYST, PUB. NO. D121, HIGH POTENTIALS IN THE
PIPELINE: ON THEIR WAY TO THE BOARDROOM (2013); ALICE H. EAGLY & LINDA L. CARLI,
THROUGH THE LABYRINTH: THE TRUTH ABOUT HOW WOMEN BECOME LEADERS (2007).
301. EAGLY & CARLI, supra note 300; Richard F. Martell et al., Sex Stereotyping in the
Executive Suite: “Much Ado About Something,” 13 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 127 (1998).
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they are perceived as pushy, bossy, and unkind—all attributes that are not
attributed to men who engage in the same self-promotional behaviors. 302
This extensive body of social-psychological research documenting
barriers to women’s ascent of the corporate ladder is relevant to understanding
the same-actor doctrine. When women are initially hired, they are hired on the
basis of whether their current skills fit a given position. As they build their
careers within an organization, however, they increasingly target higher
positions that demand greater leadership skills and agentic traits, characteristics
stereotypically viewed as more characteristic of men than of women. 303 This
gendered context characterizing promotion and advancement opens the door
for managerial subjectivity and discretion and can unleash bias against women.
They may be disproportionately passed over because they do not “seem like
leaders,” or because they are perceived as “too difficult” when they engage in
behaviors that facilitate advancement. These stereotype-driven perceptions will
become more salient and relevant the longer a woman stays in a position,
showing how the delayed ascent of the corporate ladder may occur to women
even though they were initially viewed as strong fits for a less agentic position.
In other words, as work demands change in a given workplace context, so too
do opportunities for the expression of implicit bias.
Finally, we turn to the second strand of the economic rationality doctrine:
the theory that an economically rational racist (or sexist) individual would
discriminate at the hiring stage rather than at later stages of the employment
relationship given the higher marginal costs of discrimination. This theory is
troubled on its own terms for two reasons. First, focusing exclusively on
marginal costs, the theory fails to consider marginal benefits, even to actors
with a “taste for discrimination,” by hiring women and minorities into a
workplace—a diversity premium. Because female and minority hires diversify

302. Laurie A. Rudman & Peter Glick, Feminized Management and Backlash Toward Agentic
Women: The Hidden Costs to Women of a Kinder, Gentler Image of Middle Managers, 77 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1004 (1999); Laurie A. Rudman & Kimberly Fairchild, Reactions to
Counterstereotypic Behavior: The Role of Backlash in Cultural Stereotype Maintenance, 87 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 157 (2004); Laurie A. Rudman et al., Status Incongruity and
Backlash Effects: Defending the Gender Hierarchy Motivates Prejudice Against Female Leaders, 48 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 165 (2012).
303. Linda Krieger and Susan Fiske have reasoned that disparate treatment doctrine
incorporates the descriptive behavioral theory that biased decision makers discriminate consistently
across contexts. See Krieger & Fiske, supra note 7, at 1042. As both they and we have argued, the
context in which a decision maker chooses to hire a woman is markedly different from the context in
which a decision maker chooses to promote that woman to a leadership position. These contexts entail
different norms, different kinds of information, different experiences with the employee, different
criteria, and different schemas, scripts, and stereotypes applicable to the employee to be hired or
promoted. As a result, a biased decision maker will likely discriminate differentially across contexts.
See Kaiser & Wilkins, supra note 8, at 462, 465 (“[S]trongly identified group members are more likely
to be the recipients of prejudice and discrimination than weakly identified group members. . . . In
situations in which majorities and minorities have frequent contact with each other, majority group
members can use behavioral observations to draw inferences about identification.”).
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the workplace, these marginal benefits operate primarily at the hiring stage.
Second, the theory assumes that there are economically rational racist (and
sexist) individuals in American workplaces who seek to cost-benefit maximize
their “taste for discrimination.” The chief difficulty is that for these actors the
doctrine modifies the ex-ante default rule and creates a license to discriminate
against female and minority employees whom they have hired. For these
actors, the doctrine reduces the effectiveness of discrimination claims by
members of protected groups—a meaningful deterrent. The license, therefore,
reduces the marginal cost of discrimination at later stages of the employment
relationship. As such, bias against women and minorities becomes more
economically rational, which is a troubling implication, especially if one
presupposes that managers with “a taste for discrimination” lurk in American
workplaces. 304
C. Closing the Circuit Split on the Same-Actor Inference
Having called into question the epistemological tension between the lay
theories animating the same-actor doctrine and the vast psychological science
available to jurists and scholars, we now turn to closing the circuit split on the
same-actor inference. 305
To begin, the same-actor inference is not codified in any federal civil
rights statute. That is, no federal court has squared the same-actor doctrine with
the text of Title VII itself or the legislative history of federal civil rights
enactments. Instead, the same-actor doctrine is an interstitial doctrine, first
invented by the Fourth Circuit, and since adopted by other circuits into the
evidentiary framework for disparate treatment claims. Indeed, the only positive
law supporting the same-actor inference is, in effect, the weight of prior
elaboration of the doctrine without congressional support. Because there is no
legitimate textual or purposive justification for the doctrine, courts have largely
relied on common sense and economic rationality to predicate the doctrine. 306
304. As described in Part I.B, supra, we caution that psychological science on stereotyping,
prejudice, and discrimination reveals that bias does not operate in this blatant manner. Nevertheless,
we have chosen to expose the flaws of the economic rationality theory on its own terms.
305. In short, the flawed doctrine has been contrasted against, and shown to be manifestly
inconsistent with, wide bodies of empirical inquiry in the fields of psychology and sociology. This gap
between theory and empirical reality poses a problem, one prompting the need for critical reflection
and adaptation of the doctrine. See, e.g., WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR SOME
OLD WAYS OF THINKING (Cosmo Inc. 2008) (1907).
306. We have found one explanation that has attempted to square the same-actor doctrine with
the purpose of federal antidiscrimination law. In Proud v. Stone, Judge Wilkinson explained that the
same-actor inference of nondiscrimination advances the aim of the statute by incentivizing the hiring
of qualified minority and female applicants because the doctrine blocks any future claims of
employment discrimination. See 945 F.2d 796, 798 (4th Cir. 1991). That is, the doctrine has been
justified on the lay theory that without the defensive-liability shield of the same-actor doctrine,
employers would not hire women and minorities, or members of protected groups. This argument is
quite obviously and shamefully flawed. As we have described in Part IV.A, supra, there are many
legitimate reasons why employers choose to hire women, such as when women are the most highly
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As we have revealed at length, both of these implicit descriptive accounts are
empirically false. Further, insofar as the doctrine limits Title VII’s reach to
blatant animus by “old-fashioned” racists, the doctrine impermissibly abrogates
the central purpose of Title VII, which was congressionally enacted to eradicate
discriminatory behavior within the employment sector of the U.S. economy. 307
The same-actor doctrine has operated as a judicial heuristic swiftly
filtering out disparate treatment claims at summary judgment. The doctrine
implicitly presumes that this filter largely screens out meritless cases. However,
as the moral credentialing literature reveals, there is a hazard that firing a
member of a protected class after hiring likely resulted from bias. As such, the
judicially enacted filter is poorly engineered, screening out false negatives of
potentially meritorious cases. At summary judgment, the dismissal rate for
same-actor doctrine cases is 80 percent, and the scope of the doctrine is
broadening in circuits that have adopted the strong inference of
nondiscrimination standard. 308 Part III suggests that organizations have
responded to the moral credential and legal license by altering employment
structures to harness this defense, widening and broadening applicability of the
strong inference of nondiscrimination itself. In short, the judicial screen is
manifestly unjust on its own terms and pernicious—forming a legal license
that, like a vicious cycle, feeds back on itself to further erode the remedial
scheme that Congress enacted.
Given the lack of textual support for the doctrine and its lack of a neutral
and legitimate basis, as well as the psychological science amassed that
powerfully reveals the errors laden within the doctrine, we recommend that
federal courts resolve the circuit court split by adopting the Seventh Circuit’s
approach, most recently elaborated by Circuit Judge David F. Hamilton in
Perez v. Thorntons, Inc. 309 In that case, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
although same-actor evidence may be argued to the jury, it was not a

qualified applicants. One need only compare and contrast across circuits (some of which adopt the
strong inference of nondiscrimination, like the Second Circuit, and others that do not, like the Seventh
Circuit) to discern that the same-actor inference of nondiscrimination is not necessary to ensure that
women and minorities are hired into American workplaces. The doctrine, moreover, creates a legal
license to disparately treat qualified minority and female candidates who have joined the workplace,
affecting the potential for promotion and persistence in the workplace.
307. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2521 (2015). When creating the same-actor doctrine, the Fourth Circuit selected one of many
doctrinal possibilities to resolve the doctrinal ambiguity and indeterminacy within Title VII
jurisprudence. Bell, supra note 10, at 367; Crenshaw, supra note 9 at 1341–46. Unfortunately, the
Fourth Circuit’s doctrinal choice subordinates the experiences of members of stereotyped groups. Mari
J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV.
LIBERTIES L. REV. 323, 324 (1987) (“[T]hose who have experienced discrimination speak with a
special voice to which we should listen.”).
308. See supra Part I.B.1 & Fig.2.
309. Perez v. Thorntons, Inc., 731 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2013); see Krieger & Fiske, supra note 7,
at 1046; Martin, supra note 133, at 1168–70; Martin, supra note 196, at 360 n.206; Moss, supra note
148, at 73.
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conclusive presumption that applies as a matter of law. 310 Instead, this evidence
is “for the trier of fact to consider.” 311 Similarly, in Johnson v. Zema, the
Seventh Circuit reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
of the employer and deemed the same-actor inference inappropriate. The
Seventh Circuit concluded that, “[T]he same-actor inference is not itself
evidence of nondiscrimination. It simply provides a convenient shorthand for
cases in which a plaintiff is unable to present sufficient evidence of
discrimination.” 312 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that
the same-actor inference is unlikely to be dispositive in very many cases.
In fact, we have found no case in this or any other Circuit in which a
plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence to prove an improper motive
was able to produce sufficient evidence to otherwise sustain his burden on
summary judgment and yet was foreclosed from the possibility of relief
by the same-actor inference. 313
In a subsequent decision, Kadas v. MCI Systemhouse Corp., the Seventh
Circuit reiterated that it had “emphatically rejected the ‘same-actor inference’
in the race-discrimination setting in Johnson v. Zema Systems Corp., . . . and
our conclusion there applies with equal force to proof of age discrimination.” 314
Further, U.S. Courts of Appeals that have yet to consider the continuing
viability of the same-actor doctrine should adopt the Seventh Circuit’s
approach. In so doing, these courts would ensure that the burden-shifting
framework at summary judgment and trial remains consistent with the
psychological science that has accumulated over the past several decades.
Those courts that have applied the same-actor inference should revisit their
jurisprudence and adopt the Seventh Circuit’s jurisprudence recently elaborated
in Perez v. Thorntons, Inc. 315 Further, if the U.S. Supreme Court sees fit to
examine the circuit split on the issue, the Court should consider the robust
psychological evidence that supports abrogating the inference.
In sum, we recommend that federal courts draw on the Seventh Circuit’s
approach by narrowing the doctrine and essentially discontinue applying the
doctrine at all stages of the federal litigation process: the pleading stage,
summary judgment, and trial. When the same-actor hires and takes an adverse
action against a member of a protected group, an employer may argue that
hiring the claimant is evidence of nondiscrimination. Whether this same-actor

310. Perez, 731 F.3d at 709 (citing Blasdel v. Nw. Univ., 687 F.3d 813, 820 (7th Cir. 2012)).
311. Id. (quoting Herrnreiter v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 315 F.3d 742, 747 (7th Cir. 2002)).
312. Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 745 (7th Cir. 1999).
313. Id.
314. Kadas v. MCI Systemhouse Corp., 255 F.3d 359, 361 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
However, in at least two subsequent decisions, one of which was overruled, the court seemed to signal
the continued viability of the same-actor inference within the Seventh Circuit. See Keri v. Bd. of Trs.
of Purdue Univ., 458 F.3d 620, 648 (7th Cir. 2006), overruled by Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965
(7th Cir. 2013); Nwanna v. Ashcroft, 66 F. App’x 9 (7th Cir. 2003).
315. Perez, 731 F.3d at 699.
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evidence is convincing should be for the trier of fact to weigh along with all
other evidence. The same-actor doctrine should no longer trigger an inference
that raises the plaintiff’s evidentiary burden at the pleading stage, summary
judgment, or trial. The issue is fundamentally an evidentiary matter for the jury
to resolve. Moreover, scholars and jurists should continue to study how best to
inform juries, when relevant, about the vast knowledge accumulated in the field
of psychological science to guide juries in evidence-based decision making. 316
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have demonstrated the profound epistemological
tension between the lay psychological theories animating the same-actor
doctrine and decades of psychological science on prejudice, implicit bias,
aversive racism, moral credentials, and moral licensing. The same-actor
inference, though nominally justified on the grounds of common sense and
economic rationality, simply fails on those ostensible bases. The doctrine is
inconsistent with the best science available in the field of psychological
science. As such, this interstitial creation must be curtailed. No legitimate,
neutral, nondiscriminatory policy sufficiently justifies the doctrine. Given the
dearth of both textual support and legislative history supporting the same-actor
doctrine, federal courts should reflect and reevaluate the interstitial doctrine.
Same-actor evidence is fundamentally for the trier of fact along with all other
potential evidence of discrimination.
As such, we return where we began, with the two instances of employees
who challenge their employer’s conduct as discriminatory. We revisit these
hypotheticals to explore how their grievances would fare in light of our
recommendation.
In the first hypothetical, Betty is a female computer programmer who
works for a technology company in Silicon Valley. Betty applied for a
promotion to a supervisory position, but Mike ultimately chose not to promote
her. Instead, Mike promoted Carl as a supervisor under the assumption that
Carl would be a better leader of computer programmers, despite being less
qualified than Betty. In this first example, if a federal court applies the sameactor doctrine, the court would apply a strong inference of nondiscrimination at
summary judgment and require Betty to provide powerful direct evidence of
discrimination. In contrast, our recommendation would be that the same-actor
316. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond et al., The “Kettleful of Law” in Real Jury
Deliberations: Successes, Failures, and Next Steps, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1537 (2012); Sara Gordon,
What Jurors Want to Know: Motivating Juror Cognition to Increase Legal Knowledge & Improve
Decisionmaking, 81 TENN. L. REV. 751 (2014); Jessica M. Salerno & Shari Seidman Diamond, The
Promise of a Cognitive Perspective on Jury Deliberation, 17 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 174
(2010); Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race-Based Judgments, Race-Neutral
Justifications: Experimental Examination of Peremptory Use and the Batson Challenge Procedure, 31
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 261 (2007); Duane T. Wegener et al., Flexible Corrections of Juror Judgments:
Implications for Jury Instructions, 6 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 629 (2000).
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doctrine should not apply. Instead, the fact that Mike was the manager who
both hired and failed to promote Betty would be circumstantial evidence that
the technology company could offer as evidence of a lack of discriminatory
intent against women before the jury. On this evidence, a jury may find Betty’s
employer not liable after deliberating. However, there would be no mandatory
inference, presumption, or heightening of the evidentiary burden foisted on
Betty at summary judgment. Mike’s status as the manager who both hired
Betty and failed to promote her is simply one evidentiary datum in the entire
context of the situation that Betty challenges as an unlawful failure to promote.
The trier of fact would grapple with whether the technology company
unlawfully imposed a glass ceiling on Betty, a female computer programmer.
In the second hypothetical, Jason is an African American unloader for a
logistics company in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. Mike hired Jason three years ago.
Although Jason complained to Mike about Dan’s disparate write-ups, rather
than investigating Jason’s complaint, Mike fired Jason after several incident
reports. Applying the same-actor doctrine, a court would apply a strong
inference of nondiscrimination, requiring Jason to combat this inference of
nondiscrimination with direct evidence of bias. In contrast, our
recommendation would be that the same-actor doctrine should not apply.
Again, the fact that Mike was the manager who both hired and fired Jason
would be circumstantial evidence of nondiscrimination. That is, the jury could
decide to draw on this circumstantial evidence if it wishes to do so. There
would be, however, no heightening of the evidentiary requirement on Jason at
summary judgment. Again, Mike’s role as the same supervisor who hired and
fired Jason would be one evidentiary data point in the entire fabric of the
chronology leading to Jason’s claim of unlawful termination.
In this Article, we have introduced a body of psychological science that
speaks directly to how prejudice and discrimination operate in modern
American workplaces. An important finding in this body of research is the
psychological phenomena of moral credentialing and moral licensing. 317
People feel more comfortable acting in ethically questionable ways when they
can point to evidence that previously demonstrated a lack of prejudice. 318 After
making a decision that favors a member of a stereotyped group, such as by
hiring or promoting an applicant (even if that employee was eminently
qualified to be hired or promoted), a subsequent decision about a member of a
stereotyped group is more likely to result in the manifestation of bias. When
making the subsequent decision, people are less likely to self-monitor to ensure
that they act in egalitarian and unbiased ways. Troublingly, the same-actor

317. See Merritt et al., supra note 32; Miller & Effron, supra note 32.
318. See Bradley-Geist et al., Moral Credentialing, supra note 33; Effron et al., supra note 20;
Effron et al., Inventing Racist Roads, supra note 33; Effron, supra note 33; Mann & Kawakami, supra
note 33; Monin & Miller, supra note 22.
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doctrine materially reinforces and reifies this psychological license into a legal
license to engage in bias.
In conclusion, the assumptions of human nature embedded within the
same-actor doctrine are contrary to psychological science. The same-actor
inference presupposes that the same-actor who hires and takes adverse action
against a member of a stereotyped group is bias free. Yet, psychological
science reveals the error of this flawed account of human nature. Federal courts
must remain cautious and vigilant about the possibility of bias in the sameactor context. Indeed, circuit courts that apply the strong inference of
nondiscrimination at summary judgment have the matter scientifically in
reverse and have created a manifestly unjust, and behaviorally unrealistic,
judicial heuristic. In curtailing the same-actor doctrine, the Seventh Circuit has
applied the most sound and appropriate jurisprudential approach and should be
justly applauded.
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0

0

0
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